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INTRODUCTION

The electronic processing of health data provides invaluable benefits to patients and health care providers. These benefits include speed
and flexibility of information processing, retrieval, and communication;
long-term cost savings due to increased efficiency; and the availability
of powerful computational techniques that can contribute to improved
patient outcomes.! Unfortunately, some of these same attributes enable
the operation of a market in illicitly obtained private health information. The Internet provides a nearly ideal channel for trafficking in
such information because it permits the information to be transmitted
anywhere in the world quickly, cheaply, and with relatively little risk of
detection.2 This Article analyzes the threats to electronic health records
and the deficiencies of regulations that have been enacted to address
them. 3 It also develops recommendations for improving safeguards for
these records. 4
The risks associated with the electronic storage and transmission
of personal information in general and health data in particular are
indeed grave. A New Year's Day 2006 article in the New York Times included the following statement
Every week seems to bring reports of a new breach of the computer networks that contain our most intimate personal information. Scores of companies--including Bank of America,
MasterCard, ChokePoint and Marriott International-have
admitted to security lapses that exposed millions of people's
financial information to potential abuse by identity thieves.5
Another article reported that between February and June of 2005 alone,
"businesses, universities, and government agencies lost ... ten million
records" and that, according to a Gallup poll conducted in August of
2005, nearly one out of five Americans experienced identity theft 6 In
1 See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electront"c Health Records. 2007 U. ILL. L REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with au-

thors} (discussing the advantages of electronic health records).
2 See Young B. Choi et al., Challenges Associated with Privacy in Health Care Industry: Implementation of HIPAA and the Security Rules, 30 J. MEn. Svs. 57, 60 (2006) (stating that private information can be distributed worldwide within seconds) .
.!1 See infra notes 5-30, 48-193 and accompanying text
4 See infra notes 194-333 and accompanying text.
5 John Schwartz, The Nation: Spy Game; What Are You Lookin' at?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2006, § 4. at 1.
6 Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine: Stopping Identity Thift, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 2005, at

17.

-----
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May of 2006, a burglary at the home of a Department of Veterans Affairs
employee resulted in the well-publicized theft of cliscs containing names,
birthdates, and Social Security numbers of as many as 26.5 million military veterans. 7 Even private cell phone use is vulnerable to public clisclosure. 8 Reportedly, dozens of Internet-based companies sell information
concerning calls made and received by cell phone users, which they obtain by posing as customers and asking for copies of bills. 9
The confidentiality of personal health information appears to be
compromised with disturbing frequency. A report that focused on discarded hard drives and disk sanitization practices disclosed that in August of 2002, the U.S. Veterans Administration Medical Center in Indianapolis sold or donated 139 of its old computers without removing
confidential information contained on their hard drives, including the
names of veterans who had AIDS and mental illnesses. 10 An earlier paper published by the British Medical Association reported numerous
instances of private health information abuse, including the case of a
banker who served on a state health commission and obtained a list of
all cancer patients in his state, which he used to single out these individuals and call in their loans. 11 On April 26, 2006, Aetna announced
that a laptop computer containing personal information concerning
38,000 consumers had been stolen, and on May 12, 2006, a newspaper
article reported that a computer breach may have led to the theft of
personal information relating to 60,000 patients who visited Ohio University's health center.l2 Other reported incidents include an inadvertent Internet posting of identifying information and details of the sex
lives of ninety psychotherapy patients, an inadvertent posting of sixty
children's psychological records on the University of Montana's website, a hacker's illegal downloading of thousands of patients' medical
files from a university medical center, and the stealing of health infor7

David Stout & Tom Zeller, Vast Data Cache About Veterans Has Been Stolen, N.Y. TIMES,

May 23, 2006, atAl.
a See Sheryl Harris, Are Your Cell Phone Records Safe? Web-Based Companies Offer Data Telling Numbers You Called for as Little as $100, PurN DEALER, jan. 14, 2006, at AI (reporting
that one company charges only $100 for information about a customer's last 100 calls).
9

Id.
Simson L. Garfinkel & Abhi Shelat, Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study of Disk Sanitization Practices, 1 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 17, 17 (2003).
II Ross J. ANDERSON, BRITISH MED. Ass'N, SECURITY IN CLINICAL INFORMATION SvsTEI'\15 5 {1996) (citation omitted).
12 Jennifer Gonzalez, 3rd Computer Breach at OU Within 3 Weeks: Recards Involve 60,000
Who Used Health Center, PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2006, at Al; see Press Release, Aetna, Statement of CEO and President Ronald A Williams on Data Security (Apr. 26, 2006), available
at http:/ /WW1.v.aetna.com/ news/2006/pr_20060426.htm.
10
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marion belonging to military personnel and their families from a contractor's database.!'
Why would anyone want to obtain the health information of others? The reasons are numerous. Private health information can be useful to employers who wish to hire and retain the healthiest employees, 14
lenders and other businesses with a stake in individuals' financial futures and thus in their health statuses,15 drug companies that wish to
influence doctors' prescribing decisions, 16 advertisers and marketers
who wish to tailor their material for particular audiences,l7 health insurers making eligibility and premium rate decisions concerning individual insurance policies, and even educational institutions that might
wish to recruit and accept students with the greatest potential for success and longevity. In a world in which electronic health information

t.!l DANIEL j. SOLOVE, ThE DIGITAL PERSON 54-55 (2004); see also Nicolas P. Terry, To
HIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technica~ Conceptua~ and Legal Frameworks Jar Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER L. REv. 133, 163 (2005) (describing other examples of dysfunctional
"privacy and security systems").
H ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5 (reporting that as of 1995, "over half of America's
largest 500 companies admitted using health records to make hiring and other personnel
decisions"). It should be noted, however, that these health records were most likely lawfully
obtained because the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA") permits medical
testing of applicants and employees with some limitations, though it forbids discrimination
against qualified employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), (d) (2000). Employees who are sick or vulnerable to illness are often unappealing to employers because
they can cause absenteeism, productivity, scheduling, and morale problems in the workplace and can raise health insurance costs. Questions concerning the meaning of the
terms "qualified" and "disability," and thus the ADA's scope of coverage, have generated
considerable litigation. See generally Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the
ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1213 (2003).
IS ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit
reference agency to trade health records).
Ifi Id. at 5 (stating that a U.S. drug company purchased a health systems company and
obtained a prescription database for fifty-six million people, which it was planning to
search for individuals whose prescriptions suggested that they suffered from depression
and could benefit from Prozac, a drug produced by the company); see also Robert Steinbrook, For Sale: Physicians' Prescribing Data, 354 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 2745, 2745 (2006) (re·
porting that during the last two decades, health care information companies routinely
have purchased electronic prescription records from pharmacies and elsewhere, which
they then sold to drug manufacturers); Stephanie Saul, Doctars Ofdect as Drng Makers Learn
Who~ Prescribing What, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at A1 (describing computerized records
with information concerning physicians and the drugs they prescribe that are used by
drug sales representatives to influence doctors to write more prescriptions for drugs produced by their companies or fewer prescriptions of a competitor's drugs).
17 Prieto, supra note 6, at 18 (asserting that "[a]s advertisers have sought greater return
on their doiiar, they are increasingly relying on personal data to target ads" based on particular attributes); see also Terry, supra note 13, at 162 (stating that Pin is "valuable for
secondary uses" such as marketing).

~~~~~~~---,~~~~~~~~~~~~·j]
:J,
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can be easily stolen or accessed, it could also become increasingly appealing to blackmailers and other criminals. 18 For example, after a
computer was stolen from a general medical practice, two prominent
women received letters from blackmailers who threatened to publicize
the fact that the women had undergone abortions. 19 Even potential
romantic partners looking for a low-risk mate might try to obtain personal health information if it were easily accessible.
Trafficking in personal health information poses a significant risk
to the public. Once the data is dispersed on the Internet, it becomes
available to anyone who is willing to pay for it, 2° and it cannot be expunged. Consequently, the harm to an individual from illicit or accidental disclosure of health information is potentially unlimited. It is
quite possible for the affected individual to remain unaware of the disclosure and its consequences,"~ and it may be difficult or impossible to
establish how the disclosure actually occurred. Loss or corruption of
health data can also require the duplication of painful medical tests or
even cause serious and life-threatening medical errors.
Americans are aware of these dangers. A 2005 National Consumer
Health Privacy Survey, which queried 2000 people, revealed that sixtyseven percent of respondents were "somewhat" or "very concerned"
about the confidentiality of their medical records.22 Furthermore, thirteen percent of respondents claimed that they had attempted to protect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regular
physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests outof-pocket so that no medical documentation would be sent to insurance companies.23
To address the data security threats associated with the electronic
storage and transmission of private health information, the U.S. Deta See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5; COMPUTER Sci. &

TEI.ECOMM.

Bo., NAT'L RE-

SEARCH CoUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 3

(1997) (stating that hackers may penetrate computerized systems to steal data, destroy it,
or damage the system).
19 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 5.
20 See id. at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to
trade health records).
21 See Prieto, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that the average victim becomes aware of identity theft only after fourteen months, but in some cases discovering the crime takes ten
years). This Article does not specificaiJy address the theft of PHI, which could be hidden
more easily because the consumer \viii not see suspicious charges on her credit card or telltale credit reports.
22 LYNNE "SAM., BISHOP ET AL., CAL. HEALTHCARE FoUND., NATIONAL CONSUMER

HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY 2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005).
:!!1

Id. at4.
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partment of Health and Human Services ("HHS") enacted the Security
Rule under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA").24 The Security Rule is part of the larger HIPAA Privacy
Rule established in the HIPAA privacy regulations25 promulgated pursuant to HIPAA's statutory authority. 26
The HIPAA Security Rule, which became effective on April 20,
2005 for most covered entities,27 delineates administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information ("PH1").2B Under the
Rule, PHI includes "individually identifiable health information" that is
electronically or otherwise transmitted or maintained.29 "Covered entities" include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
providers that transmit health information electronically.'"
Many have criticized various aspects of the broader HIPAA Privacy
Rule,'1 but few have focused specifically on the regulations' Security
Rule. It is our view that the HIPAA Security Rule has serious deficien-

24 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-.318 (2006); see a/.so Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,242, 43,242-43 (Aug. 12, 1998) (providing background concerning

the Security Rule's purpose).

"45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-.534.
"42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to 1320d.S (2000 & Supp. ill 2003).
27 45 C.F.R. § 164.318. Small health plans were given an extended adjustment period
and were required to comply with the Rule by April 20, 2006. Id.

"Id. §§ 164308-.312.
"Id. § 160.103.
!O

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006). A health care clearinghouse is defined as follows:

[A] public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing company,
community health management information system or community health information system, and "value-addedn networks and switches, that does either
of the following functions:
(1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information received from
another entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content into standard data elements or a standard transaction.
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or facilitates the processing of health information into nonstandard format or
nonstandard data content for the receiving entity.

Id.
.91

See PEw

INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ExPosED ONLINE: WHY THE NEW FEDERAL

HEALTH PRIVACY REGULATION DoESN'T OFFER MUCH PROTECTION TO INTERNET UsERS

6-8

(2001) (discussing the fact that many health-related websites are not covered entities); SoLOVE, supra note 13, at 70 (stating that the "HHPAA regulations have apparently pleased nobody" because health care providers "complain that the regulations are too complicated,
cumbersome, and expensive to follow" and privacy advocates "find the regulations weak and
ineffective").
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des that hinder its efficacy as a mechanism to impede the operation of
a market in illicitly obtained Pill.
These deficiencies are of four principal types. First, the IDPAA
statute, and thus the Security Rule, do not address trafficking in private
health information by businesses and individuals outside of the health
industry, such as employers, marketers, and lenders that are not "covered entities. "32 Consequently, these parties are permitted to handle
health data without restriction under IDPAA. 33 Second, although the
IDPAA Privacy Rule allows patients to inspect and copy their Pill,34 it
does not enable individuals to establish the provenance of the data or
verify how the information has been used. 35 Third, the IDPAA Security
Rule gives covered entities an excessive amount of discretion in deciding what implementation specifications they wiii address and how they
will do so, and many of its standards and implementation specifications
lack sufficient detail and specificity. 36 As a result, careless or unscrupulous covered entities are very likely to become the main source of iiiicitly obtained Pill. 37 Furthermore, weii-meaning but resource-poor covered entities that cannot develop sophisticated expertise with respect to
computer security technology are given insufficient guidance as to how
to achieve compliance with the Security Rule.'" Fourth, the IDPAA privacy regulations, including the Security Rule, do not establish a private
cause of action for aggrieved individuals.'9 Thus, insufficient enforcement mechanisms significantly diminish the regulations' deterrence and
remedial powers. <o
The remainder of this Article proceeds as foiiows. Part I describes
the relevant Security Rule provisions. 41 Part II critiques the Rule and
" See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3) (defining a "covered entity" as a "health plan," "health
care clearinghouse," or "health care provider who transmits any health information in
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter").
!1!1 See id.
34 !d.§ 164.524(a) (1) (establishing that an "individual has a right of access to inspect
and obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated
record set").
!15 See id.
"See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2006) (establishing that "[c) overed entities may use any
security measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement
the standards and implementation specifications" of the Security Rule in a provision entitled "Flexibility of approach").
37 See id.
sa See id.
39 See id. §§ 160.300-.552; Peter A Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy
Rules and the Common Law, 33 RuTGERS LJ. 617, 618 (2002).
"See45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300--.552.
41 See infra notes 48-91 and accompanying text
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exposes its weaknesses.42 To address the Security Rule's deficiencies,
this Article proposes in Part Ill a detailed set of recommendations for
enhancing PHI security.-tl We acknowledge the challenge of crafting
static regulations for an area that is dynamic by nature because both
computer technology and security threats are continually changing. We
also recognize the potential tension between patients' needs for privacy
safeguards and businesses' needs for efficient and profitable operations. We have considered the implications of our proposal in a variety
of circumstances and have evaluated them through detailed examples.
Our recommendations include: (1) expanding the definition of
"covered entity" to include any person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for
any business purpose related to the substance of such information;«
(2) broadening the right of access to PHI so that affected individuals
can obtain information concerning its provenance and uses; 45 (3) revising several of the Security Rule's provisions to provide further detail
and guidance, and establishing mechanisms that will facilitate compliance;46 and (4) adding a private cause of action to the law's enforcement scheme. 47 Although we focus our critique on the Security Rule,
some of our recommendations, such as changes in statutory definitions
and scope, necessarily would extend to the Privacy Rule as a whole.
I.

THE

HIPM

SECURITY RULE

The HIPM Security Rule establishes general security requirements
and provides implementers with broad discretion in choosing appropriate technologies to implement the standards.4B One of the Rule's
guiding principles is "technological neutrality," an approach based on
the belief that regulators should not dictate the use of specific technologies, which may be inappropriate in particular settings or superseded by improved tecbnologies. 49 It is clear from the public comments
42

See infra notes 92-193 and accompanying text
See infra notes 194-333 and accompanying text
44 See infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 239-243 and accompanying text
46 See infra notes 244-318 and accompanying text.
47 &e infra notes 319-333 and accompanying text.
48 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-.318 (2006); see also Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8336 (Feb. 20, 2003) (stating that the final Rule was written "to
frame the standards in terms that are as generic as possible and which, generally speaking,
may be met through various approaches or technologies").
49 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed Reg. at 8335 (describing
the drafters' "basic assumptions that the entities affected by this regulation are so varied in
411
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received by HHS to the initial proposed version of the Security Rule
that industry strongly favored such discretion.5o
A. HIPAA Securit;y Requirements
The Security Rule establishes four general requirements. Covered
entities must: (l) ensure the "confidentiality, integrity, and availability"
of electronic health information that they produce, obtain, maintain,
or transmit; (2) protect the data against reasonably anticipated threats
to its security or integrity; (3) safeguard against impermissible use or
disclosure of the information; and (4) ensure that their employees comply with the Rule.5 1 Covered entities may choose the means by which to
"reasonably and appropriately" implement the Rule's standards, so long
as they consider their size, complexity, capabilities, and technical infrastructure in making their decisions along with the costs of implementation and the risks of security breaches. 52
The HIPAA Security Rule features "standards" and then "implementation specifications" that provide instructions concerning how to
fulfill the obligations outlined in the standards. There are two types of
implementation specifications: required and addressable.53 Required
implementation specifications are mandatory.54 By contrast, implementers may respond to an addressable implementation specification in one
of three ways: (l) by implementing it, (2) by implementing an "equivalent alternative measure," or (3) by doing neither because implementation would not be "reasonable and appropriate. "55 A covered entity that
does not implement an addressable implementation specification must
document its justification for not doing so,S 6 and all covered entities

terms of installed technology, size, resources, and relative risk, that it would be impossible

to dictate a specific solution or set of solutions that would be useable by all covered entities").
so Id. {stating that "[m]any commenters also supported the concept of technological
neutrality, which would afford them the flexibility to select appropriate technology solutions and to adopt new technology over time"); see also id. at 8336 (explaining that numerous commentators asserted that "the security standards should not be overly prescriptive
because the speed with which technology is evolving could make specific requirements
obsolete and might in fact deter technological progress").
·
51 45 C.F.R § 164.306(a). Permissible and impermissible uses of private health information are described in Subpart E of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Id. §§ 154.500-.534.
"Id. § 154.305(b).
"Id. § 154.305(d).

"45 C.F.R. § 154.305(d) (2) (2005).
"Id. § 154.305(d) (3).
55 Id. § 154.305(d) (3) (li) (B) (I).
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must review their compliance and modifY their security measures as
needed.57
1. Administrative Safeguards
Several required implementation specifications are intended to
provide administrative safeguards. sa These safeguards include risk analysis and risk management practices, the establishment of sanctions for
noncompliant employees, and information system activity reviews. 59
Covered entities also must identifY a "security official" who is responsible
for compliance with the Security Ru1e and establish procedures whereby
only authorized individuals have access to electronic PID. 60 To achieve
workforce security, a covered entity shou1d implement authorization
and supervision standards, workforce clearance procedures, and termination of authorization procedures, but these are considered addressable implementation specifications.5 1
In addition, a covered entity shou1d implement a security awareness and training program for its workforce and implement measures
such as security reminders, mechanisms that protect against malicious
software, log-in monitoring, and password management. 62 The Security
Rule mandates the creation of response and reporting mechanisms for
security incidents63 and contingency plans that focus on data backup,
disaster recovery, emergency mode operation, testing and revision procedures, and analysis of the criticality of the affected data and applications. 54 It also instructs that covered entities should perform periodic
evaluations of their compliance65 and may enter into written contracts
or other arrangements with business associates to handle electronic
Pill, so long as the associates provide satisfactory assurances that they
will appropriately safeguard the data. 66 The Security Rule, however,
does not apply to the transmission of electronic PHI to another health
57 Id. § I64.306(e).
"Id. § I64.308{a).
· "'45 C.F.R § l64.308(a) (I) (ii).
"45 C.F.R § l64.308(a) (2)-(3) {i) (2006).
fil Id.§ J64.308{a)(3)(ii).
fi!! ld. § 164..308{a) (5). These are addressable implementation specifications. Id.
"ld. § J64.308(a) (6).
64 /d.§ 164..308(a) (7). The development of testing and revision procedures and applications and data criticality analysis are addressable implementation specifications. Id. The
other safeguards are required. ld.
"45 C.F.R § l64..308(a)(8).
66 45 C.F.R § l64.308(b) (I), {3)-(4) (2006); see also id. § I64.3I4 (listing specifications
regarding business associate contracts and other arrangements).

2007]

Protecting Electronic Private Health !nfonnation

341

care provider who is treating the patient, a group health plan sponsor,
or agencies determining eligibility for government programs providing
public benefits. 67
2. Physical Safeguards
The HIPAA Security Rule next establishes physical safeguards aimed
at thwarting unauthorized access to electronic information systems and
the facilities in which they are housed while ensuring access to authorized personnel. 68 This subsection describes several "addressable" implementation specifications regarding contingency operations, fucility security plans, access control and validation procedures, and maintenance of
records concerning repairs and modifications to security-related components of the physical plant.69
In addition to safeguarding workstation security,7° a covered entity
must establish procedures that govern the movement of hardware that
contains electronic Pill within and outside of the facility in question.71
These procedures should address electronic media disposal, removal of
PHI in cases in which equipment will be reused for other purposes,
maintenance of records of the hardware's whereabouts and who is responsible for it, and data backup and storage prior to moving equipment.72
3. Technical Safeguards
The required and addressabJe73 technical safeguards detailed by
the HIPAA Security Rule are designed to ensure that only authorized
personnel have access to electronic PID. 74 These safeguards include
assigning unique user identification names or numbers, establishing
emergency access procedures, having an automatic logoff after a specific period of inactivity, and implementing encryption and decryption

67 !d.§§ 164.308(b) (2), .502(e) (I) (ii) (C).
"Jd. § 164.310(a)(1).
"Id. § 164.310(a) (2).
"Jd. § 164.310(b)-(c).
7! 45 C.F.R § 164.310(d) (1).
72 45 C.F.R § 164.310(d)(2) (2005). The implementation specifications for disposal
and media reuse are required, while the record-keeping and data backup and storage requirements are addressable. /d.
7!1 See infra notes 75-76 (indicating which safeguards are required and which are addressable).
"45 C.F.R § 164.312(a) (I) .

.---

342

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:331

mechanisms.75 This provision also discusses audit controls, authentication mechanisms for electronic PHI and its users, and measures to ensure security when electronic PHI is transmitted electronically. 76

B. Enforcement
The HIPAA legislation authorizes both civil and criminal penalties.?? Given that HHS is not authorized to conduct criminal prosecutions, however, the privacy regulations only address the civil penalties. 78
Under a Final Rule issued by HHS on February 16, 2006, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule's enforcement provisions also are applicable to the Security Rule.79 Thus, if a covered entity discloses health information in an
unauthorized manner for any reason, it can be penalized. 80 In addition,
it can be penalized for the absence of appropriate security measures
even if no PHI is disclosed.Bl
These provisions establish a primarily complaint-driven enforcement scheme for privacy violations.82 Persons83 who believe that a covered entity is violating the Privacy Rule may submit a complaint to the
Secretary of HHS, who has discretion as to whether to investigate it 84
The authority to administer and enforce the Security Rule has been
delegated to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"),
75 Id. § 164.312(a)(2). Unique user identification and emergency access procedures
are required, while automatic logoff and encryption and decryption mechanisms are addressable implementation specifications. I d.
'iii ld. § 164.312(b)-(e). Mechanisms for infonnation authentication and integrity controls for the transmission of data are designated addressable. Jd.
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to 1320d.fi (2000). The criminal penalty provision is discussed
further infra no.te 88 and accompanying text.
78 45 C.F.R §§ 160.400-.426 (2006).
79 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb.
16, 2006) (stating that "[t]he final rule amends the existing rules relating to investigation
of noncompliance" and the imposition of penalties uta make them apply to all of the HIPM Administrative Simplification rules, rather than exclusively to the privacy standards");
see also 45 C.F.R § 160.300 (making the enforcement provisions applicable to all ffiPAA
rules, including the Security Rule). Originally, the enforcement provisions applied only to
Subpart E of the Privacy Rule, which limits the circumstances under which covered entities
can use and disclose PHI. See 45 C.F.R §§ 164.500-.534.
" 45 C.F.R §§ 164.500-.534.
Bl ld. §§ 164.302-.318.
B2 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,224, 20,226
(Apr. 18, 2005). The regulations, however, also provide that HHS may conduct compliance
reviews without receiving a complaint 45 C.F.R § 160.308; .HIPAAAdministrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,226.
83 A uperson" is defined as a unatural person, trust or estate, partnersllip, corporation, professional association or corporation, or other entity, public or private." 45 C.F.R § 160.103.
"45 C.F.R § 160.306(a), (c) (2006).

-------------------~
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and thus, CMS investigates alleged violations relating to the Security
Rule speci:fically. 85 If a covered entity is found to be noncompliant, it
will be informed by the Secretary, who will, if possible, attempt to resolve the matter informally. 86 The Secretary has authority to impose civil
penalties for noncompliance in an amount not to exceed $100 per violation, or $25,000 during a calendar year "for all violations of an identical requirement."87 In addition, violators may be subject to criminal
prosecution and fined up to $250,000 and may face imprisonment for
up to ten years. 88 A respondent may also request a hearing before an
administrative law judge (an "ALJ") .89 As is typical in administrative

BS Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegation of Authority Notice, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60,694, 60,694 (OcL 23, 2003). On March 25, 2005, CMS issued a notice entitled
"Procedures for Non-Privacy Administrative Simplification Complaints Under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," which became effective on April 25,
2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 15,329, 15,33!}-31 (Mar. 25, 2005). The notice states that ifCMS finds a
violation based on a complaint. it will work with the covered entity "to obtain voluntary
compliance." Id. In the absence of cooperation, "the Secretary wiii pursue other options,
such as . .. civil money penalties." Id. at 15,331.
"45 C.F.R. § 160.312(a)(1).
B7 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 160.508. A civil penalcy may not be
imposed for a violation if it is punishable as a criminal offense under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6,
which is administered by the Department of Justice. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b) (1); HIPAA
Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 20,237.
sa See 42 U.S. C. § 1320d-6. This provision, entitled 'Wrongful disclosure of individually
identifiable health information," states:

(a) Offense
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;
(2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individual; or
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Penalties
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both;
(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not more
than $100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain,
or malicious harm, be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.

Id.
"45 C.F.R. § 160.504(a).
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proceedings, only limited discovery is permitted, 90 and the ALJ is generally not bound by the Federal Rules ofEvidence.91
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE SECURITY RULE
The HIPAA Security Rule is characterized by several flaws and deficiencies that greatly detract from its efficacy. These relate to the narrow definition of "covered entity," the limited access individuals have to
information concerning their PHI, the Rule's insufficient compliance
guidelines, and the lack of a private cause of action for Privacy Rule
violations. This Part will analyze aJl of these shortcomings.
A. Covered Entities

The HIPAA Security Rule follows its enabling legislation, the HIPAA statute, and covers only health plans, health care clearinghouses,
and health care providers that transmit health information electronica!ly.92 Consequently, doctors, hospitals, pharmacists, health insurers,
and health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") must comply with the
HIPAA privacy standards, but not aJl parties possessing PHI are covered. 93 Thus, websites selling nonprescription medications or dispensing medical advice,94 employers handling applicants' and employees'
medical records, marketers, or any other business entities that obtain
PHI are not bound by the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. 95
The Rule's narrow scope of coverage compromises its ability to protect
Americans against misuse of their PHI. It leaves the vast amount of
health information stored on systems maintained by noncovered entities especia!lyvuloerable to theft, destruction, or alteration. 96
In fact, it is arguable that the greatest PHI-related threats are associated with the acquisition of PHI by non-health-care-related entities.
"See45 C.F.R § 160.516 (2006).
91 Id. § 160.540.
"Id. § 160.102(a).
95 SO LOVE, supra note 13, at 208; Wino, supra note 39, at 618 (affirming that the "Rules
do not subject to legal sanction any of the numerous entities whose access to personal
health information has exploded with the increased use of electronic health information").
94 See PE\V INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, supra note 31, at 6--8; David L. Baumer et al.,
Internet Privacy Law: A Comparison Between the United States and the European Union, 23 Cor.rPUTERS & SECURITY 400, 410 (2004) (emphasizing that websites in the United States are

not regulated with respect to most transactions, including those involving health information).
95 SoLOVE, supra note 13, at 208.
95 CoMPUTER Sci. & 'Th:LEcoMM. Bo., supra note 18, at3.
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Many commentators have expressed concern that clisclosure of health
information can lead to loss of various types of insurance; employment
and educational cliscrimination; denial of loans; and severe clisadvantages in custody battles, adoption efforts, parole proceedings, and personal injury lawsuits. 97 Blackmail, identity theft, and other crimes perpetrated by those with access to illicitly obtained PHI are also grave
dangers.9B
The European Union (the "E.U.") has tackled the contemporary
threat to privacy by non-health-care-related entities very aggressively.
The E.U. Privacy Directive provides wide-ranging privacy protection.99
It binds ''Member States"100 and extends to the processing of all personal data by any party, with few exceptions.101 Specifically, the Directive's broad language establishes that "Member States shall prohibit the
processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership,
and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. "102 It then delineates exceptions to the rule, which, in the case of health information, relate to the provision of meclical care.I03
By contrast, the United States has a much more segmented approach to privacy, though it has enacted numerous inclividual Jaws that
address privacy issues. The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, governs all
federal agencies.1°4 The law forbids the disclosure of personal information (with some exceptions), aims to safeguard the security of records,
and allows inclividuals to review their records and request corrections
of errors. 105 Although the law covers only federal agencies, it is in some
ways much broader than the HIPAA Privacy RuJe because it defines "record" to mean not only meclical data, but also identifiable information
97 Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REv.
755, 764-65 (200l);Joanne L. Hustead &Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 2BA:r.t.J.L.
& MED. 285, 288 (2002); Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing. Genetic
Medicine, andManawd Caro 34 WAitE FOREST L. REv. 849, 887 (1999).
9B See supra notes 5-23 and accompanying text.
!l9 See generally Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection oflndividua1s with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such

Data, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter E.U. Privacy Directive].
1on ld. arL 1, 'j1, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 38.
lOt Jd. art. 3, 1: 2, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 39. The exceptions include matters such as the
processing of information for security purposes or criminal law and processing "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity." !d.
1o> !d. arL 8, 'j1, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 40.
"' Id. arL 8, 'j1 2-3, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 40-41.
104 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
"' Id. § 552a(b)-(e).
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about people's "education, financial transactions, medical history, and
criminal or employment history."I06
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is devoted to privacy.107 It
requires financial institutions to respect customers' privacy and shield
the security and confidentiality of customers' private information. 108 To
this end, the law prohibits financial institutions from disclosing "nonpublic personal information" to a nonaffiliated third party if the disclosure is not authorized by the law109 and requires regulatory agencies to
establish standards concerning appropriate "administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards" for private information. no
A number of other laws also protect privacy in particular realms.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 governs the accessibility and disclosure of certain student records. 111 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 mandates that cable operators inform
subscribers of any personal information that is collected, the disclosure
of such information, and the subscribers' right of access to the information.112 Information cannot be collected or disclosed without the customer's written or electronic consent unless it is needed for a '1egitimate business activity. "113 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
governs electronic surveillance and restricts searches and interception
of wire, oral, and electronic communications.1 14 The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 provides that video store operators may not disclose
the titles of the videos rented or purchased by any particular customer,
though some exceptions apply. 115 The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994 requires states to obtain a driver's consent before divulging personal information contained in motor vehicle records to marketers,
unless one of the stated exceptions is applicable. 116 The Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 establishes that operators of web-

See id. § 552a( 4).
Seel5 u.s.c. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
Id. § 6801(a).
Id. § 6802(a)-(b).
11o Id. § 6801(b).
11120 u.s. c.§ 1232g (2000).
112 47 U.S. C.§ 551(a)-(d) (2000 & Supp. Til 2003).
WI Id. § 55l(b)-(c). The law further provides that cable operators may not disclose to
the government "records revealing cable subscriber selection of video programming from
a cable operator" and must destroy personally identifiable information when it is no
longer needed. Id. § 551 (c)(2)(D). (e).
114]8 u.s.c. §§ 2511, 2701 (2000).
115]8 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (3), (b) (I) (2000).
116]8 u.s.c. § 2721 (2000).
106
107
1"

w•

I

~~j

!1

2007]

Proteding Eledronic Private Health Infonnation

347

sites targeted at children must acquire parental consent to use the personal data of children under the age ofthirteen. 11 7
The laws cliscussed above provide varying degrees of privacy protection to in clivi duals with respect to particular kinds of information or
particular holders of private information.1 18 It is unlikely that the
United States will be willing to adopt a privacy law that is as far-reaching
as the E.U. Privacy Directive. In the spirit of already existing U.S. legislation, however, we should have at the very least a law that narrowly targets only health information but is broad enough to include within its
scope all parties that maintain or transmit such information in electronic form for business reasons related to the substance of the PHI.
This approach already has been suggested in a bipartisan bill introduced by Senator Hillary Clinton and then-Senator Bill Frist, entitled the Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of2005.119 The bill
was designed "[t] o reduce healthcare costs, improve efficiency, and improve healthcare quality through the development of a nationwide interoperable health information technology system. "12 0 The bill provided that the HIPAA privacy regulations be amended to "apply to any
health information stored or transmitted in an electronic format. "12 1 In
Part III of this Article, we similarly recommend that the term "covered
entity" in the HIPAA Privacy Rule be expanded to include any person
who stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for any
business purpose related to the substance of the PHJ.l22

B. Accessibility
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients access to their PHI. 1"' Specifically, the regulations provide that "an inclividual has a right of access
to inspect and obtain a copy of protected health information about the
individual in a designated record set," with some exceptions, such as
psychotherapy notes and information compiled for purposes of litiga-

ll715 u.s.c. §§ 6501(1). 6502 (2000).
us For a critique of the privacy laws, see SOLOVE, rupra note 13, at 67-72.

ll9 S. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Terry, supra note 13, at 138.
'" S. 1262, 109th Cong. pmbl.
121 !d. § 2907.
122 See infra notesl98-212 and accompanying text.
"' 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2006).
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tion or administrative proceedings.J24 Furthermore, the Privacy Rule
enables individuals to request amendment of PHI that is incorrect. 125
If the definition of "covered entity" is expanded to include any
person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic Pill for any business purpose related to the substance of the
Pill,l26 the right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of Pill should
extend to all electronic Pill that is processed by any covered entity. In
addition, the right to correct Pill should be similarly extended. Thus, if
an employer127 or a bank obtains Pill in order to make employment or
loan decisions, the individual who is the subject of that information
should have a right of access to that data and a right to amend it if it is
incorrect
Furthermore, the right of access should be expanded to include a
right to establish the provenance of the data and the purpose for which
it is used. This approach has been utilized by the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which requires all consumer reporting agencies to disclose to consumers, upon request, not only the information in the consumer's file,
but also "the sources of the information. "128 In the case of health care
providers, health plans, and many health care clearinghouses, the origins and purposes of the data will be obvious from the documents
themselves, and thus, this requirement will add no burden to the covered entity. In the case of other parties, however, establishing the
provenance and uses of the information could be essential to determining whether the Security Rule has been breached by any covered entity,
by allowing the inappropriate dis~emination of PHI. Information concerning the data's origins also will be necessary to ascertain whether
criminal prosecution should be pursued, how widely the information
has been distributed, and how much harm might be done to the individual at issue.
As discussed above, Pill is already commonly targeted by hackers.129 It is not unrealistic to expect that a black market will develop for
Pill to which businesses, marketers, blackmailers, and others could
turn to purchase health information. According to one source, about

Id. § J64.524(a) (1).
Id. § 164.526-(a). The provision also specifies the conditions under which a request
to amend records can be denied ld.
·
126 See supra notes 92-122 and accompanying text.
127 See Americans with Disabilities Act ofl990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000), for details
concerning the obligations of employers with respect to medical information.
l2B 15 U.S. C.§ 1681g(a) (1)-(2) (2000).
129 See supra notes 5-23 and accompanying text.
124
125
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$10 billion in U.S. medical transcription business is outsourced to for-·
eign countries. 13° Foreign data processors of 'PHI are "business associates"131 of covered entities, and are bound by certain privacy protection
requirements under the HIPAA regulations.l 32 HHS has admitted,
however, that it is unable to regulate effectively offshore business associates or monitor their contracts with U.S. companies. 1' 3 It is entirely
possible that businesses or individuals processing PHI in distant locations, far from the direct reach of U.S. regulatory powers, will begin
selling PHI to third parties who believe it offers opportunities for
profit.
Several databases already sell lists of persons suffering from a large
number of ailments.I3< In addition, health care information companies
sell individual physicians' prescribing records purchased from pharmacies to pharmaceutical companies that use them to market particular
drugs to specific doctors.I35
These lists are not necessarily compiled by illegal means. Rather,
medical and other personal data can often be mined from purchase
information, supermarket savings cards, surveys, sweepstakes and contest entries, U.S. Census records, credit card transactions, phone records, credit records, product warranty cards, or public records that are
rightfully in the possession of those aggregating the information.I36
Consequently, individuals are vulnerable to manipulation, exploitation,
and discrimination by those who have access to their PHI. The patients,
in turn, should, at the very least, be empowered to learn the origins
and uses of PHI possessed by various parties.
This disclosure approach is consistent with the one adopted by the
E.U. Privacy Directive.l37 The Directive provides that each data subject
I!IDTerry, supra note 13, at 164.
tst 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2006) (defining "business a.'isociates").
1!12 Id. § 164.504(e) (establishing standards for "business associate contracts"). The provision mandates that, with some exceptions, contracts between a covered entity and a business
associate "may not authorize the business associate to use or further disclose the information
in a manner that wouJd violate the requirements of this subpart, if done by the covered en-

tio/." Jd.
1!19 Terry, supra note 13, at 165 (citing Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y of
Health & Human Sem., to Edward]. Markey, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (June 14, 2004)).
134 See EJec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Privacy and Consumer Profiling, http:/ /www.epic.org/
privacy/profiling (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); see, <g., Hippo Direct, Medical and Healthcare
List, http:/ /www.hippodirectcom/ListSubjectN_l.asp?ISubject-11 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007);
Med. Mktg. Servs., Inc.. http:/ /www.mmslisiS.org/privacy/profiling (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
1!15 Stein brook, supra note 16, at 2745.
136 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 134.
m See generally E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99.
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may obtain "confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are
being processed and information at least as to the purposes of the processing," as well as the recipients, contents, and source of the data. 138 The
approach is also consistent with the Fair Information Practices (the
"FIP") outlined in a report issued by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare in 1973.139 The FIP provide, in relevant part:
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used.
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without his consent.
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must ensure the reliability of
the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.14o
Under these principles, data subjects have a right to know how their
Pill is used. They should also have a right to know the source of the information possessed by any party so that they can ensure that their information is not being misused or utilized for purposes for which it was
not intended. In Part ill, Section B, we discuss mechanisms for allowing
meaningful inquiry concerning the origins and uses of electronically
stored Pill.

C. Insufficient Compliance Guidelines
The Security Rule leaves the mechanisms of implementing the outlined security standards to the discretion of the covered entity. 141 Although flexibility is often a desirable quality, it can also be hazardous in
the regulatory context because it can leave those subject to regulation
without sufficient guidance as to how to comply with legal require1"
139

E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, art 12(a), 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 42.
See generally DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 8ERVS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS

AND THE

RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY CoMMnTEE ON AUTOMATED

PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), available at http:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/
tocpre.fucemembers.htm.
140 See generaUy id. The FIP have not been codified into any specific law in the United
States, but rather, have served as the basis for some of the privacy laws discussed in this Article. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of the Fair Information Principles: The Foundation of Privacy Public Policy, http:/ /www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2007).
141 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (2006).
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ments. 142 In the context of the Security Rule, it is unrealistic to expect
that every health care provider has the technical expertise and ability to
determine on its own how to implement the security standards.
Furthermore, some organizations could use the regulations' vagueness as a justification for establishing minimal PID security measures. It
already appears that information technology is a low priority for the
health care industry. As of 2002, only two to three percent of the industry's funding was devoted to the electronic management of PID, compared to ten to fifteen percent of funding devoted by other industries
to advance information technology.J4ll Furthermore, the health care
industry is "generally considered to be ten to fifteen years behind other
industries with regard to security. "144
A careful reading of just a few of the Security Rule's provisions illustrates its characteristic weaknesses. In a provision entitled "Flexibility
of approach," the Rule states, "Covered entities may use any security
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately
implement the standards and implementation specifications. "145 The
regulations elaborate on the "reasonably and appropriately" standard
only by instructing covered entities to take into account the entity's
size, complexity, capabilities, and technical infrastructure; the security
measures' costs; and the "probability and criticality of potential risks to
electronic protected health information. "146 The above language does
not define the term "criticality" and fuils to provide guidance concerning how to identify "potential risks."147
Likewise, in its "Administrative safeguards" section, the Security
Rule requires covered entities to "[c]onduct an accurate and thorough
assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information. "148 No further details are provided concerning how the complex
task of risk analysis should be accomplished.

Choi et al., supra note 2, at 62 (characterizing the HIPAA privacy regulations as a
document that is the current passing standard for privacy" and predicting
that covered entities will experience difficulty "interpreting ex~ctly what l-DPAA security
standards mean to their company and what exactly constitutes compliance").
14.'1 /d.
14-1 Nancy A Lawson et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule: An Overoiew cif Compliance Initiatives
and Requirements, 70 DEF. CouNs.J.127, 147 (2003).
14s 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (1).
146 [d.§ 164.306(b) (2).
147 See45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (2) (2006).
HB I d.§ 164.308(a) (1) (ii) (A).
142

"loosely~worded
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In response to comments received during the proposed Rule's public comment period, HHS explained:

A thorough and accurate risk analysis would consider "all relevant losses" that would be expected if the security measures
were not in place. "Relevant losses" would include losses caused
by unauthorized uses and disclosures and loss of data integrity
that would be expected to occur absent the security measures. 149
This description, however, also lacks sufficient specificity. For example,
· whose losses are to be considered-those suffered by the data subjects,
by covered entities, ISO by business associates, or by other stakeholders?
How direct or remote should the potential risks be in order to be considered? Unauthorized disclosure of PHI to various parties can affect
insurance coverage, job prospects, family dynamics, and even social opportunities.I51 Should all of these potential consequences be contemplated?
If covered entities are to maintain discretion under the Security
Rule's flexible approach, !52 the key to ensuring that they choose effective security measures is a requirement that they implement rigorous
risk analysis and management processes. These processes should ident:i:ly, analyze, and mitigate the particular risks associated with health information disclosure for various stakeholders, and especially for data
subjects. The Security Rule fuils to provide sufficient guidance for the
development of such measures.
Besides exhibiting a low level of specificity in its security standards,·
the Security Rule entirely fails to address certain important issues. The
Security Rule omits an explicit requirement that covered entities, perhaps with the assistance of consultants or vendors, 153 identify the relevant best current securit:y practices of the health informatics and computer
security communities. Such a requirement is needed to ensure that
covered entities are knowledgeable about sound security practices and
"' Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8347 (Feb. 20,
2003).
tsn In this response, HFIS emphasized the potential losses that could be suffered by a
covered entity: "A covered entity that lacks adequate protections risks inadvertent disclosure of patient data, with resulting loss of public trust, and potential legal action." Id. at
8344. It is unclear why HHS did not focus on other parties that bear significant risks as
well.
151 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
m 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (1).
tss See infra notes 268--292 and accompanying text (discussing the services of security
product vendors).
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emergent security risks and their countermeasures. The rapid exploitation of newly discovered vulnerabilities in software systems and applications by attackers makes it essential that covered entities be extremely
diligent in learning about and responding to vulnerabilities. Covered
entities or their agents should utilize the substantial amount of relevant
information that is provided by reputable organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO"), the Computer
Emergency Response Team ("CERT"), the National Institute of Standards and Technology ( ''NIST"), the National Information Assurance
Partnership (''NIAP"), and software vendors. 1M
Another crucial omission from the Security Rule is guidance concerning the risks inherent in the development, operation, and maintenance of the computer software that provides the functionality of systems that process electronic PID. Such software is often extremely
complex, comprising many thousands or millions of program instructions, most of which are executed only under particular conditions. Errors in software development are virtually inevitable. Any software defect, such as a missing or erroneous sequence of instructions, becomes
a security vulnerability if an attacker can exploit it to his or her benefit
and to the detriment of system stakeholders. Moreover, mistakes in the
configuration and operation of software easily can render it insecure, 155
as can errors made during software maintenance, 156 the process of
modifying software to correct defects or to enhance its functionality.
Thus, covered entities should be required to consider the risks associated with software as part of their risk analysis process and to follow
best current practices for software development, validation, operation,
and maintenance. These risks include, among others: incorrect functionality resulting in erroneous output, missing functionality, poor "usability," poor documentation, "crashes" and other critical failures, and
excessive costs and delays in development leading to reduced emphasis
on product quality and security.157 All of these risks can adversely affect
the security of electronic private health information.

154
155

See infra notes 269-318 and accompanying text.
SANS Inst, The Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities (Updated)-

The Experts Consensus, http:/ /www.sans.org/top20/2005 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
156 STEPHEN R

SGHACH, OBJECT-ORIENTED AND CLASSICAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING

7-13, 479-96 (6th ed. 2005).
.
157 See id.; see also PETER G.

NEUMANN,

SRI lNT'L, ILLUSTRATIVE RISKS TO THE PUBLIC

IN THE USE OF CoMPUTER SYSTEMS AND RELATED 'TECHNOLOGY (2007),

ftp.csl.sri.com/pub/users/neumann/illustrative.pdf.

available at ftp:/ /
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If compliance with the Security Rule's standards is not to be a
sham, the Rule's standards and implementation specifications must be
augmented, and covered entities must receive further guidance as to
how to achieve their obligations. Section C of Part III develops recommendations fur elucidating the Security Rule's requirements and facilitating compliance through instruments that limit the costs and burdens
it places upon covered entities.l5B

D. Private Cause ofAction
The HIPAA Security Rule does not provide for a private cause of
action. 159 Rather, enforcement is achieved through administrative procedures and hearings before an ALJ. 160 It is noteworthy that under the
Clinton Administration, the HHS Secretary's recommendations to
Congress included a proposal for a private right of action, but Congress
ultimately rejected this approach. 161
Under the enforcement system established by the regulations, any
aggrieved individual has a right to file a complaint with the HHS Secretary.162 At his or her discretion, the Secretary may investigate the complaint.163 If a violation is found, the Secretary is to impose a penalty on
the offender164 and collect the money,165 but no damages are available
for persons who are aggrieved or injured by the privacy lapse. At the
request of the covered entity, a hearing may be held before an ALJ, but
the only parties to participate are the respondent and HHS personnel.! 56
By contrast to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, many other American privacy laws establish a private cause of action.J 67 These laws provide extsa See infra notes 244-318 and accompanying text.
159

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.30G-.552 (2006); Winn, supra note 39, at 618.
See45 C.F.R. §§ 160.30G-.552; Winn, supra note 39, at 618.
Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., Recommendations Pursuant to Section 264 of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 {Sept. 11, 1997), available
at http:/ /www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pvcrec.htm ("Any individual whose rights under
the law have been violated, whether negligently or knowingly, should be permitted to
bring an action for actual damages and equitable relief. For knowing violation attorney's
fees and punitive damages also should be available.").
162 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for
Civil Rights-HIPAA. Medical Privacy-National Standards to Protect the Privacy of Personal Health Information, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (listing information concerning the filing of complaints and other matters).
16' 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c).
164 Id. § 160.402(a).
165 45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (2006).
166 Id. § 160.504(a).
167 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2000) (stating that individuals may bring
civil actions against noncompliant agencies for injunctive relief or for damages up to $1000
160
161
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plicitly for a right to recover attorney's fees and costs so that even plaintiffs with minimal damages resulting from inappropriate disclosure are
likely to find attorneys willing to litigate their cases. Like these laws, the
E. U. Privacy Directive supports the notion of private litigation and mandates that "Member States shall provide for the right of every person to
a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights" embodied in the state's
applicable privacy law.16B
We recommend that the HIPAA Security Rule's enforcement provisions, which apply to the entirety of the HIPAA privacy regulations, 169
be revised to include a private cause of action. Further details concerning suggested procedures and remedies are discussed in Part ID. 17° At
this point, however, because covered entities surely would object to the
prospect of costly and onerous private litigation, it is appropriate to justify our recommendation and analyze the contributions a private cause
of action could make to PHI security.
If the HIPAA privacy regulations are intended to protect data subjects, they must provide access to a remedy when individuals' rights are
violated and must not leave victims out of the enforcement process.
The HIPAA regulations provide little satisfaction for aggrieved persons
and discount their potential injuries by fu.iling to include them in enforcement proceedings and provide them with a personal remedy.
Moreover, private litigation is often needed as an adjunct to administrative procedures for deterrence purposes. Aggressive pursuit of
governmental enforcement actions may depend upon political prioriin cases of intentional or willful violations, as well as attorney's fees and costs); Electronic
Communications Privacy Ac~ 18 U.S. C. § 2520 (2000) (stating that "any person whose wire,
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation
of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person· or entity which engaged in that
violation such relief as may be appropriate," including actual damages, ptmitive damages,
attorney's fees, and costs); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2000)
(allowing aggrieved persons to bring civil actions for actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and equitable relief); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2000) (establishing that a ''person who knowingly obtains, discloses
or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record" for an impermissible purpose will
be liable to the individual at issue for actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and equitable relief); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 551 (f) (1) (2000) (providing that "(a]ny person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in
violation of this section may bring a civil action" in a U.S. district court for actual damages,
punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs).
·
'" E.U. Privacy Directive, supra note 99, arL 22, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at45.
169 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb.
16, 2006) (stating that the regulation's enforcement provisions now apply "to all of the
HIPAAAdministrative Simplification rules").
17D See infra notes 319-333 and accompanying text
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ties and pressures, such as the degree to which a case is perceived as
advancing the general public interest171 or budgetary and other resource allocation constraints.l72 Thus, clear violations that affect only a
single person could be ignored, and cases that would not set important
precedents might not be litigated by the government no matter how
justified prosecution would be. Such inevitable resource-rationing decisions can leave a significant deterrence void, which can only be filled
through private enforcement.
Private litigation features several important advantages over administrative proceedings. It can effectively restrict unlawful conduct through
the threat of costly and well-publicized court proceedings, and it can
often resolve cases more quickly than administrative enforcement handled by overburdened agencies.l73 Furthermore, careful judicial review
that produces published opinions can serve an important rule-making
function by setting precedents that interpret vague language in administrative regulations.'74 Cases that capture media attention, as some Jawsuits do, have the added advantage of educating members of the public
at large concerning their rights and obligations under the law. 175 By
contrast, although HIPAA mandates that ALJs issue decisions containing
findings of fuct and conclusions of Jaw, the decisions are issued only to
the parties and are unlikely to be published in any widely accessible
format. 176
In fuct, HHS already has been criticized for grossly deficient enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 177 Between April 14, 2003 and
June of 2006, HHS received 19,420 complaints concerning privacy via-

171 See Arthur Best. Monetary Damages for False Advertising, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 40
(1987) (explaining that "[p]rivate suits do not have to pass a public interest test").
172 See Ann J. Gellis, MandatOry Disclnsure for Munir:zpal Securities: Issues in Implementation,
13 J. CORP. L. 65, 86 (1987) (stating that "reliance on public proceedings as the prime

means of enforcement is subject to the direct political restraints of budget resources and
indirect political pressures regarding how those resources are directed").
17!1 See Best, supra note 171, at 40.
174 See Gellis, supra note 172, at 81 (discussing judicial rule-making functions).
175 See 45 C.F.R § 160.426 (2006). If the Secretary imposes a fine on a covered entity,
the Secretary is to notify the public "in such manner as the Secretary deems appropriate."
/d. The Secretary is given no instructions, however, as to which media outlets to utilize, and
it is uncertain whether a mere statement concerning the imposition of a penalty will generate the kind of extensive media interest that courtroom drama seems to produce.
176
177

See id. § 160.546(a), (c).
See Peter P. Swire, justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privacy,

CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, june

06/b74328!.html.

7, 2005, http:/ /www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/

!
I
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lations. 178 No civil fine has been imposed, 179 however, and as ofJune of
2006, only two criminal actions had been brought under HIPAA's
criminal enforcement provision. 180 One case prosecuted a hospital
phlebotomist who accessed the medical records of a terminal cancer
patient in Seattle and obtained credit cards in his name, 1B1 and the
other resulted in the conviction of a Texas woman who sold the medical records of an FBI agent.JB2
One might argue that several causes of action relating to privacy
violations already exist in tort law, rendering a statutory private cause of
action under HIPAA unnecessary. The tort of public disclosure of private facts consists of four elements: (1) public disclosure, (2) of a private fuct, (3) that would be objectionable and offensive to a reasonable
person, and (4) that is not oflegitimate public concem. 183 Most courts
have found that to support this theory of liability, plaintiffs must prove
widespread dissemination of personal information to the public1B4 and
have deemed this tort theory to fit mostly cases involving publication
through the media. 185 In the context of HIPAA violations, however, PHI
I7a

Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines: Lax Enforcement Puts Patients' Files at

Risk, Critics Say, WASH. PosT, june 5, 2006, at AI. The regulations went into effect on April

14, 2003. 45 C.F.R § 164.534.
179 Stein, supra note 178.
tao Id. The criminal enforcement provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d~6 (2000),
IBI Swire, supra note 177. The defendant had charged over $9000 on the credit card
largely for video game purchases. !d. He pled guilty and was sentenced to sixteen months
in prison. Id.
IB2 Stein, supra note 178.
'"See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765, 767-68 (Ct App. 1983) (noting that jury found defendant liable for publicizing fact that plaintiff had gender corrective surgery, but overturning award based on erroneous jury instructions). There are three
other kinds of invasion of privacy torts, none of which are likely to be relevant in the case
of Pill disclosures-intrusion on seclusion, appropriation of name/likeness, and placing
someone in a false light. &eRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652A (1977).
184 Winn, supra note 39, at 653; see Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F.
Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.S.C. 1985) (stating that "[c]omrnunication to a single individual or to
a small group of people" will not support liability under a theory of public disclosure of
private facts, which requires publicity rather than publication to a small group of people);
Beard v. Akzona. Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (emphasizing that publication to a small number of people will not create liability); Tollefson v~ Price, 430 P.2d 990,
992 (Or. 1967) (stating that public disclosure occurs only when the information is communicated to the public generally or to a large number of people); Vogel v. W. T. Grant
Co., 327 A2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1974) (explaining that the tort is established only if disclosure
is made to the public at large or the information is certain to become public knowledge);
Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999) (stating that
"publicity, as opposed to mere publication, is what is required to give rise to a cause of
action for this branch of invasion of privacy").
tss SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 59-60 (explaining that this tort "appears to be designed
to redress excesses of the press").
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generally will be delivered to particular interested parties, such as drug
representatives, employers, or individuals with criminal intent, rather
than to the general public, and thus, the tort of public disclosure of private facts will be inapplicable.
A more fruitful tort theory for plaintiffs might be breach of confidentiality.186 Courts have based the patient's right of confidentiality
upon a variety of sources, including privilege statutes protecting physician-patient communications, licensing statutes prohibiting the disclosure of patient information without authorization, and medical ethics
principles articulated in the Hippocratic Oath and other sources.I 87 In
HrYme v. Patton in 1973, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that a physician breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing medical information to the patient's employer.!•• The court ruled that a
doctor has a duty not to disclose patient information obtained in the
course of treatment and that a private cause of action exists in cases
where the duty is breached. 189 An action for breach of confidentiality
can be maintained regardless of the degree to which the information
has been publicly distributed, and there is no requirement to prove the
intent of the perpetrator.I90
Nevertheless, in general, the tort of breach of confidentiality can
be established only when the perpetrator and the victim of the breach
of confidentiality had a direct relationship.l 91 Plaintiffs have also occasionally prevailed against third parties who knowingly induced physicians to reveal confidential information in violation of physician-patient
confidentiality responsibilities, but here too, the improper disclosure
was made by the doctor.J 92 In addition, because breach of confidential186 Sec Winn, supra note 39, at 652-58 (discussing the common law tort theory of
breach of confidentiality and its implications).
167 Id. at 654-55.
188

287 So. 2d 824,829-30 (Ala. 1973).

Id.
190 Winn, supra note 39, at 657-58 (comparing the torts of invasion of privacy and
1B9

breach of confidentiality).
191 Id. at 662; see Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 527-28, 530, 536 (Or.
1985) (finding that a mother who had given her daughter up for adoption had a cause of
action for breach of confidentiality against a doctor who helped her daughter discover her
mother's identity and explaining that "only one who holds the information in confidence
can be charged with a breach of confidence").
192 Wfnn, supra note 39, at 661-65; see Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243
F. Supp. 793, 795 {N.D. Ohio 1965) {suit brought against a physician's malpractice insurer
that had induced the physician to disclose the patient's confidential medical records when
no malpractice case was pending); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Mass. 1985)
(suit brought against individuals who obtained information from the plaintiff's psychiatrist
and used it to make an adverse employment decision); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hasp., 715
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ity is a common law tort, the standard for establishing liability can vary
from state to state.193
The breach of confidentiality tort, therefore, will not extend to
cases in which insurers or clearinghouses, rather than physicians or
hospitals, legitimately possess PHI and disclose it to third parties who
are not entitled to the data. Similarly, if the definition of "covered entities" is extended to encompass a large variety of parties in possession of
PHI, the breach of confidentiality tort will not apply to disclosures
made by employers, data miners, and others who obtained PHI by
means other than physician disclosure.
Consequently, a statutory cause of action is needed to capture the
many privacy threats that do not fit within the narrow bounds of common law causes of action. A federal statutory cause of action with explicit guidelines regarding damages will diminish inequities and inconsistencies in case outcomes.
Ill.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this Part, we provide four primary recommendations to enhance
the efficacy of the Security Rule in particular, and to some extent, the
Privacy Rule in general. These include: (1) expanding the scope of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule through revision of the definitions of "covered entity" and ''health information"; (2) enabling individuals to receive information concerning the provenance and uses of their PHI; (3) bolstering existing standards and implementation specifications, and providing covered entities with guidance and meclianisms that will facilitate
compliance wiili ilie Security Rule's requirements; and (4) establishing
a private cause of action for aggrieved individuals. 194 Our recommendations are designed to create fixed regulations that are workable in ilie
dynamic and ever-changing realms of computer technology and security
vulnerabilities. They also seek to balance patients' needs for privacy protection against businesses' needs to operate efficiently and profitably.
We have carefully crafted our definitions to avoid creating unrealistic
burdens for iliose who cannot bear iliem. We also have considered ilie
N.E.2d 518, 520 (Ohio 1999) (involving a law firm that induced a hospital to allow it to
review all patient files to determine whether the patients were eligible for Supplemental
Security Insurance Disability benefits, and thus, presumably, might wish to utilize the law
firm's services); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 649-50 (W.Va. 1994)
(involving an employer who inappropriately obtained information from a physician who
treated the plaintiff for injuries for which he claimed workers' compensation).
193 See sources cited supra note 192.
I!H See infra notes 195-333 and accompanying text

- •• -~---
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implications of our proposals in a variety of circumstances, which we
illustrate through detailed examples.
A Expanding the Regulatory Scope

In order to expand the scope of the Privacy and Security Rules,
two regulatory definitions must be altered. The terms at issue are "covered entity" and "health information." This Section will formulate recommendations for revisions of the definitions, 195 discuss the changes'
impact on the Privacy Rule's "uses and disclosures" provision, 196 and
critique alternative approaches to the suggested changes. 197
1. Covered Entities
Because health care providers, insurers, and clearinghouses are by
no means the only entities to maintain and transmit PHI, it is illogical
to limit the jurisdiction of the Security Rule in particular and the privacy regulations in general to these three types of entities.198 The threat
to electronic PHI reaches fur beyond the health care field because a
variety of parties, such as marketers, blackmailers, and anyone with a.
stake in an individual's financial future, might be interested in obtaining health information.I99
Consequently, the term "covered entity" in the HIPAA Privacy
Rule200 should be expanded to include a fourth component, namely,
"any person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable
health information in electronic form for any business purpose related
to the substance of such information." At the same time, some of the
Privacy Rule's "Applicability" sections2°1 and the "Applicability" provision of the HIPAA legislation itse!f2°2 would need to be revised to add
the above-described fourth covered category.
The term "Person" is defined in the privacy regulations as "a natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional asso. dation or corporation, or other entity, public or private. "203 The term

' 95

See infra notes 198-223 and accompanying text
See infra notes 224-235 and accompanying text.
197 See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text
198 See supra nates 92-121 and accompanying text
199 See supra notes 5-23, 92-121 and accompanying text
2 00 See 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2006) (providing the current definition).
'" Id. §§ 160.102, 164.104.
202 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1 (a) (2000).
2" 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 .
196

.

--

---
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----.~·.-.---.
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"business" should be defined as an "activity or enterprise undertaken
for purposes of livelihood or profit.''2°4
Admittedly, limiting the scope of regulatory coverage to those who
utilize Pill for business purposes related to the substance of the Pill
will result in the persistence of some sigoificant security threats. For
example, volunteers associated with religious organizations might collect and electronically store large volumes of information about community members who have been hospitalized or have disabilities for
purposes of providing them with assistance. If this data is not secured
through adequate computer technology and security practices, it could
be inadvertently or deliberately disseminated to unwanted sources. Yet,
this volunteer activity could not be defined as "business" under the
proposed revision and would not be addressed by the Privacy Rule.
Nevertheless, it is inadvisable to extend the regulations beyond this
suggested revision because doing so, ironically, could result in increased governmental invasion of privacy rather than enhanced privacy
protection. To illustrate, a definition of "covered entity" that included
any person who handled electronic Pill for any reason whatsoever
would capture private citizens who e-mailed each other about a friend's
medical problem. These individuals would be required to purchase
costly security technology for their computers and be subject to penalties for disseminating news of the illness to third parties without the
data subject's consent. Such a rule would constitute unwarranted government intrusion into purely private matters.
Application of the privacy regulations to volunteer activities also
would be undesirable because the cost of compliance and the threat of
liability might deter engagement in charitable work and, therefore,
hurt rather than promote the interests of those who are sick or have
disabilities. It also should be recalled that several relevant causes of action exist under tort theories, such as public disclosure of private facts
and breach of confidentiality.2°5 Thus, disclosures of private health information by parties not covered by the Privacy Rule's revised definition could, in appropriate circumstances, be addressed through tort
law, if they cause ~ury to the data subject. 206
Furthermore, limiting covered entities to those that knowingly
process individually identifiable health information in electronic form
for any business purpose related to the substance of such information
204

Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911) {providing similar defmition);

BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004) (same).
!!05
20ii

See supra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
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addresses the fact that some parties might unintentionally and inadvertently come to possess health information. For example, a photo shop
that develops pictures from digital cameras could handle pictures revealing scars and physical impairments or memorializing hospitalizations, births, and otherhealth-related events. These might be stored for
a time on the business's computer even though no employee specifically knows of their existence or uses them for any purpose relating to
health and medicine. It would be excessive and impolitic to burden all
photo shops with the requirements of the Security Rule and other privacy regulations based on the possibility that some of the pictures they
develop will contain medical data.
The final qualification of the definition, which restricts covered
entities to those that process PHI for any business purpose related to the
substance of such information, aims to exclude those who might come to
handle some form of PHI in the course of their business but who do
not actually use the contents of the information. Thus, the photo shop
described above would be excluded from coverage not only for the reasons already discussed, but also because it does not utilize the contents
of health information concerning individuals for any business purpose.
To illustrate further, a small "mom and pop" store might sell overthe-counter medications along with food and other items. If a customer
pays by credit card, these drugs might be scanned for payment purposes and associated with the customer's credit card number in electronic transaction records. The store operators, however, would retain
the information only for purposes of credit card records and would not
utilize specific information concerning the customer's health-related
purchases for any business purpose.2°7 It would be inappropriate to require the mom and pop store to comply with the HIPAA privacy regulations' requirements based solely on its sale of pain relief or cold medications.

By contrast, pharmacies selling prescription drugs that are labeled
with the patient's name and doctor's instructions have far more extensive information about patients, including the names of their doctors,
histories of their prescription drug purchases, and other details, which
they utilize for purposes of refills and identifying repeat customers who
fill new prescriptions. Drug stores are thus justifiably covered entities.2°8

!!117 If, however, the store operators wished to sell individually identifiable information
about the purchase of health products to third parties and thereby profit from its process-.
ing, they would become covered entities.
:!OB SeeSOLOVE, supra note 13, at 208.

.~----- ·~-~-···--··-··--··-
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Under the proposed definition, most if not all "business associates"
also will become covered entities because they are hired specifically to
process PHI. 209 This coverage is consistent with the existing regulations,
which state that a "covered entity may be a business associate of another
covered entity" and will provide reinforced protection to data subjects. ' 10 Business associates will not only be bound by the terms of their
contracts with other covered entities, which are governed by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 211 but also will be themselves subject to all of the Privacy
Rule's provisions, HHS investigations and administrative enforcement
actions,212 and private litigation in case of statutory violations.

2. Health Information
The recommended expansion of the definition of "covered entity"
will necessitate a parallel expansion of the meaning of "health information," which is found in the privacy regulations' definition section'1' as
well as in HIPAA's statutory definition section.214 ''Health information"
currendy means:
[A]ny information, whether oral or recorded in any form or
medium, that:
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or
university, or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual, the provision of health
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment
for the provision of health care to an individual.215
This definition excludes PHI that is provided by individuals without
the involvement of a health professional and is handled by financial
'"' See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (defining "business associate"); see a~a id. § 164.314
(stating contractual requirements relating to the proceSsing of PHI by business associates).
Under the contracrual terms demanded by 45 C.F.R. § 164.314, it would be very difficult
for a business associate to claim that it did not know it was processing PID and thus escape
IDPAA responsibilities. To avoid any ambiguity, however, covered entities should slate explicitly in their contracts that they are hiring business associates to process PHI.
210 Seeid. § 160.103.
mId.§ 164.314 (articulating the standard for business associate contracts).
212 See id. §§ 160.500-.552. Unfortunately, business associates in foreign countries are
likely to be beyond the reach ofHHS enforcement.

m JrL § 160.103.
42 u.s.c. § 1320d(4) (2000).

214

!!15

Jd.
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institutions, marketers, website operators, and many other parties with
an interest in individuals' electronic PHJ.216
A more appropriate definition can be derived from the proposed
Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005,217 discussed previously. 218 This bill defines ''health information" to mean "any information, recorded in any form or medium, that relates to the past, present,
or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the
provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual."2 19 This language does not limit ''health information" based on who its creator or
recipient was.
Although this definition is quite broad, it should be qualified to
require a clear association between data and the physical or mental
health status of a particular individual. Recall the above example of a
grocery store selling nonprescription medication, vitamins, or dietary
supplements.22° Do records of purchases of such items constitute
"health information"? On the one hand, data miners may be able to
infer the existence of particular diseases from a series of seemingly unrelated purchases. 221 On the other hand, many substances can be utilized for a broad spectrum of conditions, ranging from a headache to
post-surgical care, and many items are bought for use by persons other
than the purchaser. The fu.ct of the sale does not clearly reveal specific
information concerning a particular individual's health status. Consequently, records of sales of nonprescription health-related goods should
not be covered by HIPM even if they are maintained in electronic
form.2 22 We therefore recommend that "health information" be defined as "any information, recorded in any form or medium, that
clearly relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health
or condition of an individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual."
Because we cannot anticipate every circumstance that will arise
and require interpretation of the regulatory standards, we cannot proSee id.
m SeeS. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005).
21a See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying texL
'" 5.1262 § 2901(3).
!!l!O See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
221 Buying a combination of high calorie dietary supplements, pain medication, and
particular vitamins could indicate that an individual has AIDS or cancer.
222 PHI that is inferred by data miners from such records and used for business purposes would, however, be covered under our definition.
216

L---~---'-----~~---1
'
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vide comprehensive guidance conceming the meaning of "health information" in every hypothetical instance. Further elucidation of the
Privacy Rule's requirements will be achieved over time through further
guidance by HHS and the courts in response to specific controversies.223

3. Uses and Disclosures
The new definition of "covered entity" would render all of the privacy regulations' provisions applicable to anyone who knowingly transmits or maintains electronic PHI for any business purpose related to
the substance of the PHI. A particularly significant section of the Privacy Rule is the "uses and disclosures" provision, 224 which prohibits the
utilization and dissemination of PHI without the patient's consent except in specific circumstances that generally relate to medical treatment
or obligations established by law.225 With an expanded definition of
"covered entity," this provision would have a dramatically greater impact because it would constrain many more parties handling PHI. This
consequence is a salutary development that wm provide much more
meaningful protection for individually identifiable health information.
Employers, life insurers, marketers, retailers, and others could not use
PHI or disclose it to third parties without obtaining the consent of the
data subjects.
The required contents of covered entities' notice of privacy practices, including use and disclosures, are specified in the federal regulations. 226 The regulations also require that each authorization be signed
and dated by the data subject.227 The regulations, however, do not instruct covered entities to alert data subjects that a risk of unauthorized
disclosure will exist no matter what security measures are implemented.
Because awareness of the risk could be essential to individuals' decision
making and provision of meaningful consent, we recommend that the
regulatory notice provision be amended to require that covered entities
include a statement in their patient consent forms such as, "despite our
efforts to safeguard your privacy, a risk remains that your electronically
stored PHI will be disclosed without authorization because of an unan-

m See infra notes 233--235 and accompanying text (discussing means of contacting
HHS).
"'' 45 C.F.R § 164.502 (2006).
"'!d.§§ 164.502(a), .512.
"' Id. § 164.520 (b).
"'!d.§ 164.508(c) (1) (vi).

r
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ticipated security failure. "22B Individuals who sign an authorization containing this statement will be empowered to conduct their own risk
analysis and to make a more educated decision about consent.
The expanded prohibition will adversely affect marketing229 and
data mining operations, but it will not eradicate them. Covered entities
that wish to sell Pill would have to obtain consent from those whose
data is disclosed, 230 but this may willingly be given if the request is carefully worded. For example, many individuals might provide authorization if they are told that their information "will be used to identifY
products that will better fit your needs." Data miners that garner information from sources other than the person to which it relates would
likewise need to obtain consent for every sale of their lists. To simplify
matters, a "do not market list," similar to the "national do not call list"
that relates to phone solicitations, could be constructed.
The Privacy Rule details numerous exceptions to the use and disclosure prohibition, all of which would apply to the newly covered entities.m These exemptions include, among others, uses and disclosures
without consent that are: (1) required by law; (2) necessary for public
health activities; (3) related to victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence; (4) required for purposes of health oversight activities; (5) necessary for judicial and administrative proceedings; (6) required for
law enforcement purposes; (7) necessary to avert a serious threat to
health or safety; or (8) needed for specialized government functions.2 32
22 6 Unfortunately, covered entities will not be able to quantify the risk. such as by stating that the risk is one in a hundred or a thousand.
229 See 45 C.F.R § 164.508(a) (3) (establishing that covered entities must obtain consent for any use or disclosure of PI-ll for marketing purposes with very limited exceptions).
2!10 CJ. Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector,

2002 OJ. (L 201) 37, 41-42 (stating that "[i]f the party collecting the data from the subscriber or any third party to whom the data have been transmitted wishes to use the data
for an additional purpose, the renewed consent of the subscriber is to be obtained" and
that "[w]hen electronic contact details are obl:ained, the customer should be informed
about their further use for direct marketing in a clear and distinct manner, and be given
the opportunity to refuse such usage").
'" See45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, .512 (2006) (detailing currently permitted uses and disclosures}.
2! 2 Id. § 164.512. By comparison, the E.U. Privacy Directive, which applies to all entities
processing numerous categories of data. allows the processing of private information under
the following circumstances: (1) the data subject has consented to the processing; (2) processing is necessary for purposes of employment law; (3) the data subject is unable to provide
authorization and processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the individual in
question or a third party; (4) processing is done by a foundation, association, or other nonM
profit-seeking body for its own purposes, and no data is disclosed to third parties without
consent; (5) the data is made public by its subject or is necessary for purposes of a legal

2007]

Protecting Electronic Private Health Infonnation

367

It is possible that the expansion of the "covered entities" definition
will necessitate other unanticipated exceptions. These may be identified through public input provided during the notice and comment
period that would follow the proposal of the amendments delineated
in this Article. 233
In addition, the HHS website establishes an avenue for communicating with the agency concerning comments and questions.234 Specifically, it provides:
[Y] ou may submit an e-mail by clicking on the mailbox

(OCRPrivacy@hhs.gov). Individual responses w:ill not be provided, however, we will address concerns of general interest
through development of new FAQs or other guidance for inclusion on our web site. As an alternative, you may call the
HIPAA toll-free number at (866) 627-7748.235
Thus, inquiries could be submitted to HHS concerning the permissibility of particular uses and disclosures, whether certain data constitutes
"health information," and other matters requiring clarification.
4. Alternatives to Revising the Privacy Rule
An alternative approach to modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule
would be to amend individually a large number of laws that govern
actors who might pose a threat to medical privacy. For example, the
Americans with Disabilities Act places boundaries upon the timing,
content, and use of employer-conducted medical inquiries and examinations. 236 It does not, however, address the permissibility of acquiring medical data from third parties or the security measures that
must be applied to any health records possessed by employers.2S7 This
claim; or (6) processing is required for medical reasons. E.U. Privacy Directive,

supra note 99,

art 8, 1995 OJ. (L 281) at 40; see alsaAndrew Charlesworth, Implementing the European Union
Data Protection Directive 1995 in UK Law: The Data ProtEction Act 1998, 16 Gov'T INFO.

Q. 203,

215-18 (1999) (discussing the United Kingdom Data Protection Act of 1998 and the uses
and disclosures permitted by the law); Thea Hooghiemstra, The Implementation of Dinctive

95/46/EC in the Netherlands, with Sper:ial Regunl to Medica/Data, 9 EuR.J. HEALTH L. 219, 21921 (2002) (discussing the Netherlands's Personal Data Protection Act and its exceptions).
2!1!1 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements
for proposed administrative rules).
2M U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, http:/ /www.hhs.gov/
ocr/contacthtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
"'Id.

"'42 u.s.c. § 12112(d) (2000).
~ 7 Id.
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provision could be revised to indicate explicitly tbat it is impermissible for employers to use healtb information obtained from external
sources without tbe informed consent of tbe individuals in question
and to address tbe security of electronic medical data. As a second
example, tbe Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions
to safeguard tbe confidentiality of tbeir customers' nonpublic personal information but allows for its disclosure in a variety of circumstances.23B This law too could be tightened to establish a more rigid
prohibition of PHI disclosure and to instruct financial institutions to
employ appropriate security safeguards for computerized PHI.
Nevertheless, a piecemeal approach to enhancing PHI protection is
undesirable. First, from a practical standpoint, legislatures are unlikely
to revisit numerous statutes in order to address PHI issues. Second, tbe
process of revising multiple laws to include detailed security mandates
would be extremely cumbersome. Finally, a statute-by-statute approach is
likely to lead to inconsistencies in levels of protection furnished by different laws and to tbe introduction of new ambiguities in statutory language tbat will require judicial interpretation. By contrast, a revision of
tbe HIPAA Privacy Rule will comprehensively repair tbe law. Broadening
tbe definitions of "covered entity" and "healtb information" will significantly augment tbe efficacy of tbe HIPAA Security Rule in particular
and tbe Privacy Rule in general and will address many additional tbreats
to healtb information privacy.
B. Allowingfor Meaningful Inquiry Regarding the Origins and Uses ofPHI
As explained above, tbe HIPAA privacy regulations allow patients
to inspect and obtain copies of tbeir PHI from covered entities. 239 So
long as tbe only entities covered by HIPAA are healtb plans, healtb care
clearinghouses, and healtb care providers, tbe origins and uses of tbe
documents generally should be obvious from the documents themselves and the party from which tbey were obtain.ed. However, if tbe
privacy regulations are expanded, as we recommend, to cover any person who knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable health
information in electronic form for any business purpose related to tbe
substance of such information, it will become important for individuals

~ 8 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6802 (2000). For example, the statute permits disclosure "to a
nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial
institution, including marketing of the financial institution's own products or services
.... " Id. § 6802(b)(2).
"'45 C.F.R § 164.524(a) (!) (2006).
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to be able not only to have access to Pill that is possessed by others, but
also to establish the provenance of the data and the manner in which it
has been used. This evidence will be vital for determining both the extent of the injury to the individual and the existence of Privacy Rule
breaches by data sources.
The requirement of informed consent for the use or dissemination of Pill should allow individuals to remain educated concerning
the movement of their Pill in most cases.240 A party that wishes to
transmit PHI would need to obtain authorization from the affected individuals. The right of inquiry described above, however, will provide
an added information resource in cases in which data is obtained accidentally, through the black market, or by other unlawful means.
The right of inquiry also will serve as a deterrent to malfeasance. If
a covered entity obtains Pill from a dubious source and then seeks authorization to use it, the data subject is likely to be surprised by the request for consent and to inquire about the origins of the data. An unsatisfactory response likely would lead the data subject to refuse to authorize data use and thus, the purchaser will have wasted its effort and
money in obtaining the PHI. Furthermore, the data subject may file a
complaint with the government and/ or i,nitiate litigation against the
source that distributed the Pill in violation of the regulations. The expanded right of inquiry should, consequently, incentivize covered entities to engage in due diligence to determine the legitimacy of Pill suppliers. Because it provides data subjects with an inexpensive means of
conducting preliminary investigations concerning potentially inappropriate Pill disclosures, this mechanism should also deter regulatory
violations.
The privacy regulations allow covered entities to charge a "reasonable, cost-based fee" for the copying, postage, and labor costs associated
with providing individuals access to their Pill.241 Additional payments
could be required for processing of inquiries about the provenance
and use of Pill. These charges should prevent frivolous inquiries and
harassment of covered entities by the public. 242
The process of inquiry should not be excessively burdensome for
covered entities and could be easily automated. Those processing Pill
should establish websites to which individuals can submit queries concerning whether the entity possesses their Pill, and, if so, where it origi240 See id. § 164.508(a) (discussing the requirement that covered entities obtain authorization for the use and disclosure of PHI); supra notes 224-235 and accompanying tex:L
241 See45 C.F.R. § 164,524(c)(4).
24!!. See id.
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nated and how it has been used. Generally, respondents will be able to
develop boilerplate answers to diminish the need for individually designed narratives. For example, common responses might be "obtained
from Hippo Direct list"24.'1 and "used for marketing purposes."
C. Enhandng Compliance Guidelines

The Security Ru1e provides a dearth of specific instructions for
regulatory compliance, preferring to assume good judgment on the
part of covered entities.244 This approach leaves a vacuum of guidance
for health care providers with no technological expertise.245 It also
could encourage malfeasance by prosperous covered entities that could
invest significant resources in ensuring the security of electronic PHI,
but that instead choose to take miniroal precautions.246 We recommend
that a number of steps be taken to provide more specific guidance to
covered entities.

1. Augmenting the Implementation Specifications
The HIPAA Security Rule offers skeletal and vague implementation specifications that leave many substantial gaps and loopholes. Consequently, a more robust scheme of standards and implementation
specifications would significantly advance the goal of improved security
protection for PHI.247
First, a clarification should be made to the phrase "criticality of potential risks" in the Security Rule's "flexibility of approach" provisions24B
and the "risk analysis" requirement in the administrative safeguards'
iroplementation specifications. 249 It should be clarified to indicate that

243

244

See Hippo Direct, supra note 134.

See 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (1) (stating that "[c]overed entities may use any security
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement the
standards and implementation specifications as specified in this subpart"); supra notes
141-157 and accompanying text Covered entities are instructed to consider se·veral factors
in making their implementation decisions, including their size, complexity, capabilities,
and technical infrastructure; the costs of the security measures; and the nature of the potential threats to the Pffi they maintain, but they are given no assistance in making specific
implementation decisions. 45 C.F.R § 164.306(b) (2).
"' See45 C.F.R. § 164.306{b) (I) (2006).
246 See id.
2~ 7 See supra notes 141-157 and accompanying text (critiquing the Security Rule's
flexible approach and vague guidance).
'" 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2) (iv).
'" Id. § 164.308(a) {I) (ii) (A); see supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text (critiqu·
ing these provisions of the Security Rule).

f-·-~~----1
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the risks to be considered are the risks to all stakeholders, including
data subjects, covered entities, and business associates.
Second, because effective risk analysis is crucial to a covered entity's
ability to choose appropriate security measures, the Rule must provide
further gilldance as to how risk analysis should be conducted.25° A simple way to do so would be to require covered entities to follow the NIST
Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems. 25 1 HHS cited the
NIST document as authority in its response to comments provided during the proposed Security Rule's public comment period,252 but the
Security Rule itself has no reference to it. We recommend that the
regulations' risk analysis provision25 3 be amended to require that covered entities' risk analyses be consistent with all relevant gilldelines established in the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems. If HHS determines at a later time that a better document exists
because the NIST gilldance has become outdated or a superior document is issued by a different organization, the regulatory provision
would need to be changed again to refer to the new source. 25 4
Covered entities that cannot implement this guidance themselves
for lack of expertise or resources could hire vendors to conduct the
risk analysis for them or provide them with a simplified form of the
risk analysis procedure that is tailored to their type of entity. Vendors
that specialize in electronic PHI security will be able to adapt the
NIST gill dance to particular categories of businesses that they service
and may be able to accomplish the task by asking clients to fill out a
relatively short questionnaire that will provide all necessary information. The use of vendors for HIPAA compliance purposes is discussed
in the next subsection of this Article.255

:so See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b){l} (allowing covered entities discretion to choose appropriate security measures).
m See generally GARY STONEBURNER ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., RisK

available at http:/ /csrc.
nistgov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf.
'"Health Insurance Refurm' Security Stnndards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8346 (Feb. 20, 2003).
'" 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (1) (ii) (A) (2006).
"'A draft international stnndard, ISO/DIS 27799, entitled "Health Informatics--Security

MANAGEMENT GUIDE. FOR INFORMATION 'Th:CHNOLOGY SYSTEMS (2002),

Management in Health Using ISO/IEC 17799," contains a thorough discussion of threats to
the security of health information. Seelnt'l Org. for Stnndardization, ISO/DIS 27799, hnp:/ /
mvw.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?GSNUMBER=41298&scopelist=
PROGRAMME (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). If this standard is passed and the risk assessment
section remains intact, the regulations may need to make reference to ISO 27799 as well, because, unlike the NIST guidance, it is specific to the health information context
:!5 5 See infra notes 269-292 and accompanying text.
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Third, the Security Rule must induce covered entities to implement the best current practices of the health informatics and computer
security communities.25 6 To that end, the "general requirements" section257 should include an additional element, placed before the current
fourth requirement, worded as follows: "Make reasonable efforts to
identily and employ best practices relating to security measures, software development, validation, maintenance, and software system administration that are either commonly used by similarly situated business entities and governmental institutions or can be clearly demonstrated to be superior to best common practices. ''258 The best current
practices requirement would apply to all standards and implementation
specifications. Thus, if a covered entity determined that it would not be
"reasonable and appropriate" to implement an addressable implementation specification, it would need to document why implementing the
specification would not constitute best current practices under the circumstances. 25 9
The best current practices standard is essential to making the Security Rule meaningful in light of the dynamic nature of the computer
security field. The text of the Security Rule must maintain a level of
generality and cannot dictate that covered entities adopt specific tech'nologies because these could easily become outdated even before the
regulations are enacted. A ''best practices" standard is an effective way
to provide some guidance while maintaining sensitivity to the computer
technology environment. This approach is not unprecedented, given
that ''best practices" standards are found elsewhere in U.S. law. For example, a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that requires the establishment of effective compliance and ethics programs allows small organizations to model their programs partly on the "best practices of
other similar organizations. "260 Likewise, an Environmental Protection
Agency regulation relating to hazardous air pollutants instructs covered
entities to design startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans that "reflect
the best practices now in use by the industry to minimize emissions. "261
As discussed below, many if not most covered entities are expected
to utilize vendors to serve their HIPAA Security Rule compliance

See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text
'" &e 45 C.F.R § !64.306(a).
25 B See id.
"' &e45 C.F.R § 164.306(d) (3) (i), (d) (3) (ii) (B) (I) (2006).
260 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 8B2.1, cmt n.2(C) (iii) (2005).
"' 40 C.F.R § 63.2852.
256
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needs, 262 and thus, they will not themselves need to engage in the work
of determining industry standards. Moreover, a plethora of information about security standards and industry practices is readily available
through the Internet and in print, published by reputable organizations such as ISO, CERT, NIST, and NIAP, as well as software vendors.263
Both vendors and covered entities should easily be able to access these
sources, from which best current practices can be ascertained. Although covered entities can rely on a reading of industry literature to
determine best practices, they should not depend upon one single
source, given that no comprehensive guidance has been produced to
cover all aspects of HIPAA Security Rule compliance. Different documents will be relevant to risk analysis, security vulnerabilities, software
engineering, system administration, and so on.264
Fourth, the Security Rule, which currently fails to address software
engineering, should include language that explicitly focuses on this
essential security component. The best practices provision described
above, which would require covered entities to make reasonable efforts
to ident:ifjr and employ best practices relating to software development,
validation, maintenance, and systems administration, is one step in the
right direction. 265 Furthermore, the risk analysis provision should incorporate an additional statement that the risks to be considered include those associated with software development, operation, and
maintenance.266 Similarly, the risk management provision should be
elucidated to state that the risks and vulnerabilities at issue include
those linked to software development, operation, and maintenance.2 67

2. Security Product Vendors and Certification
The previous subsection recommended a "best current practices"
standard as a general Security Rule requirement.268 The question to
which we now turn is how ''best practices" should be identified and implemented by covered entities.
.
One option is for CMS, in its oversight capacity, to create a centralized repository of information. CMS could maintain a website in which
it describes the security measures and technology needed by different
See infra notes 269-292 and accompanying text
See infra notes 293--318 and accompanying text.
254 See infra notes 293--318 and accompanying text
265 See supra notes 256--261 and accompanying text.
"'See 45 C.F.R. § l64.308(a)(ii) (A) (2006).
"'Seeid. § l64.308(a)(ii)(B).
268 See supra notes 256--261 and accompanying text.
262
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entities for compliance purposes, provides a current list of known security vulnerabilities in health information systems and the computing
platforms they rely upon, and designates the updates and fixes that are
sufficient to address these problems.
This approach, however, may run afoul of the notice and comment
requirements established by the Administrative Procedure Act.2 69 A
binding set of technical requirements could be interpreted to constitute rule making, which would trigger public notice and comment requirements. 27° These, in turn, would generate significant delays and
render it impossible for CMS to respond to rapidly changing technology and emerging security threats in a timely fushion. The Act establishes an exception for cases in which an "agency for good cause finds
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'~ 71 It is
possible but not certain that this exception would apply to the abovedescribed website.
Several other problems are inherent in the centralized repository
approach. CMS would require significant additional funding and personnel resources to produce and continuously update a comprehensive
set of materials for the website, and it would need to develop technical
expertise that it does not currently have. Furthermore, relying on a single source of information means that any mistakes or flaws in the information could affect all covered entities. Finally, if the government
retains power to designate best current practices, covered entities' security obligations might vacillate significantly with changes in the political environment. Thus, some administrations might articulate very
demanding standards and others very lax ones.
A superior alternative would be to allow best current practices to
emerge through the free market. Presumably, members of the computer security industry would compete to produce the best possible
products at a reasonable cost. As a check against market flaws that generate low standards within private industry, covered entities also would
be instructed to research, as part of their best practices analysis, the
computer security measures that are adopted by the government.272
26 9 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements
for proposed administrative rules).
270 See id.
211 !d.§ 553(b) (3) (B).
272 See supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text (explaining that best practices are
those commonly used by industry and governmental institutions).
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Many covered entities will lack the technical knowledge and resources to identiJY best current practices and achieve Security Rule
compliance and will require the services of computer security professionals. To that end, it would be useful for CMS to maintain on its website a list of approved vendors that can be retained by covered entities
for purposes of achieving Security Rule compliance. The vendors
would provide both products and technical assistance and would need
to have not only technical expertise but also thorough fumiliarity with
the HIPAA Security Rule. The vendors would be certified based on
proof that their technology is state-of-the-art and Security Rule compliant, that they have not been negligently responsible for any Security
Rule breaches, and that they are able to address critical new security
threats through timely user advisories, software improvements, and
automatic installation of software updates.27> Vendors would also have
to be certified for entities of particular sizes and types, because different business environments require different services.
Covered entities that retain the certified vendors would be presumed to have complied with the Security Rule's requirements, though
the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that they failed to follow the vendor's instructions or refused to accept the vendor's recommendations. It also could be rebutted with evidence that the covered
entity knew or should have known that the vendor was not actually providing products and services that were Security Rule compliant.274 This
would occur in instances in which a vendor had been exposed by a
whistleblower or the media as engaging in quackery or the sale of ineffective products. The rebuttable presumption would provide protection
against under-scrutiny by the government during the certification
process and against vendors that might act in bad faith after they are
certified in order to under-sell competitors or enjoy greater profits.
Where appropriate, the vendors should provide clients with alternatives from which they can select, depending on their resources and
capabilities. For example, covered entities that are experiencing financial difficulties could be given the option of de-identiJ}ring all of their

273 The government licenses and recertifies individuals and entities in other contexts.
For example, attorneys must pass the bar in order to practice law and, in many states, must
earn a certain amount of CLE credit each year to retain their licenses. Similarly, nursing
homes are certified and periodically surveyed for purposes of recertification. See Senator
Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Refonn: A Historical Account of the Recent
Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities Established in the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 ELDER LJ. 267, 271-72 (1999).
274 See supra note 273 and accompanying text
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electronic PHI. This would entail associating a new, automatically generated identifier, such as a random number, with a patient's electronic
health record. A list mapping these identifiers to patients' names
and/or Social Security numbers would be maintained only in paper
form. This approach would constitute an inexpensive and simple alternative to implementing sophisticated, technological security measures.
Furthermore, to achieve Security Rule compliance, covered entities should have ongoing relationships with vendors so that vendors can
provide software updates as the need arises and reassess entities every
year or two to ensure that they continue to employ current and appropriate security practices.275 Covered entities that do not hire one of the
approved vendors will be responsible for developing their own implementation measures, which must be at least as effective as those provided by certified vendors.
Proposals for certification by CMS were discussed in the comments
to the proposed Security Rule.276 CMS asserted that it did not intend to
establish certification criteria for covered entities because it did not
"have the resources to address the large number of different business
environments."277 Similarly, CMS refused to "assume the task of certifYing software and off-the-shelf products" for lack of resources and expertise.27B Instead, CMS believed that compliance assessment instruments
should be developed and implemented by the private marketplace.2 79
Certification of vendors, rather than covered entities or products,
was not discussed in the comments.280 This type of certification may be
less burdensome for CMS, because there should be fewer vendors than
covered entities or products. It is likely, however, that CMS still would
argue that it lacks sufficient resources and expertise to certifY even
vendors alone.
Nevertheless, CMS should reconsider its unwillingness to provide
some form of certification for compliance purposes. Several comments
to the proposed Security Rule emphasized the need for a list of federally approved security products and for certification procedures. 281 This
need is acute for small covered entities that do not have the funds, per-

275
276

The. reassessment might be easily achieved through a well~tailored questionnaire.
See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8352 (Feb. 20,

2003).
277

ld.

Jd.
279 I d.
!!Bo I d. at 8351-52.
28 1 See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8352.
278
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sonnel, and computer proficiency to assess their Security Rule compliance or to determine which commercially available security products
they should purchase in order to fulfill regulatory requirements. With
vendor certification, resource-poor covered entities would have an accessible and reliable mechanism to achieve compliance.
CMS acknowledged that other governmental entities are adopting
the certification approach.282 For example, NIST and the National Security Agency (the "NSA") have established the National Information
Assurance Partnership, whose goal is to help information technology
producers and consumers meet their security testing and assessment
needs.283 To that end, the NSA has established the TEMPEST284 Endorsement Program, through which it provides lists of TEMPEST telecommunications equipment, TEMPEST test services facilities, and
Commercial Off-the-Shelf telecommunications equipment that it has
endorsed. 285 Germany has embraced certification to a much larger extent. Its Federal Office of Information Security (the "BSI") provides
certification services through which information technology products
and systems are tested and certified. 286
In the comments to the proposed Security Rule, HHS stated that it
encourages professional associations to undertake assessment and implementation activities with respect to HIPAA security requirements.2 87
Assuming that the demand for certified products grows dramatically
with the expansion of the "covered entity" definition, it is likely that
some organizations would become interested in providing certification
services for a fee.
If CMS cannot certiJY the vendors themselves, at the very least it
should certiJY entities that provide certification services. There is
precedent for this practice as well. Germany's BSI not only certifies in'" Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8352 (Feb. 20,
2003) (stating that HHS has "noted with interest that other Government agencies such as the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISf) are working towards that end").
WI See Nat'! Sec. Agency Cent Sec. Serv., National Information Assurance Partnership,

http:/ /www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
284

TEMPEST INC., http:/ /www.tempest-inc.com/home.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).

TEMPEST INC. "offers TEMPEST/EMSEC and Electromagnetic Compatibility testing and
design services in accordance with current Military, FCC, Arntralian & European Community
Requirements." Jd.
21!5 Nat'! Sec. Agency CenL Sec. Serv., Tempest Endorsement Program, http:/ /www.nsa.

gov/ia/industry/tempesccfm?Menu!D=l0.2.1.3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
286 Bundesarnt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department 3: Certification,
Approval and Conformity Testing, New Technologies, http:/ /WW>v.bsi.de/english/depart-

ment3.hun (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
287

Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8352.
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formation technology security products, but also accredits and licenses
evaluation facilities so that they can assess information technology
products and systems.288 ISO, a well-respected nongovernmental global
federation established in 1946 to promote "the international exchange
of goods and services" through the creation of uniform standards, 289
has issued several standards that provide best practices guidance to
those operating certification systems. 290 One of these, ISO Guide 65, has
been adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and is applied to
companies operating product certification standards for livestock,
meat, seed, and other agricultural products. 2" CMS also could adopt
appropriate ISO certification guidelines so that it would not have to
wholly invent its own criteria. The certification bodies that are accredited by CMS would in turn certifY vendors, and use of the certified vendors' products would create a rebuttable presumption of HIPAA security compliance, as described above.292 The certifYing bodies would
have to be recertified by CMS periodically to ensure their continued
competence. Furthermore, the CMS website would list the certifying
bodies, which would then direct covered entities to the vendors they
have approved.
3. Existing Tools and Emerging Technologies
Ultimately, the electronic PHI security business could develop into
a sophisticated international industry.293 Some tools that will facilitate
regulatory compliance and certification already exist. These tools can
be used to determine best current practices in various areas covered by
the Security Rule.
ISO and the International Engineering Council ("IEC'') have published a variety of standards describing sound information security prac!!Ba Bundesamt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, supra note 286.
289 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards
Provide a Viable Alternative to GuucrnmentRegulntion?, 37 AM. Bus. LJ. 237,240 (2000).
290 ISO, Combined Search Result for "Certification," http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/
CombinedQueryResultCombinedQueryResult?queryString=certification (last visited Feb.
23, 2007).
· 291 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA ISO Guide 65 Program, http:/ /www.ams.usda.gov/
lsg/arc/iso65.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
292 See supra note 274 and accompanying text
!!9S See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrim~ 20 BERKELEY ThcH. LJ. 1553, 161{}-11 (2005) (noting that "[w]ith cybercrimes skyrocketing and an ever-increasing amount of sensitive information being exchanged on the
internet, the development of robust and trustworthy computer systems is a necessity" and
urging that "[m]ore security-conscious network architects, sofnvare designers, and website
developers are the solution").
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tices. The ISO/IEC 17799:2005, entitled "Information Technology-Security Techniques-Code of Practice for Information Security Management," establishes gilldelines and "general priociples for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management in an organization" by describing best practices in these areas.294
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 specifies the requirements for initiating, operating,
and monitoring an information security management system in light of
the organization's overall business risks.295 ISO/IEC 15408, known as the
Com1!Wn Criteria, establishes an international standard for computer security specifications and evaluations.296 Finally, ISO 27799, entitled
''Health Informatic&-Security Management in Health Using ISO/IEC
17799," will apply specifically to health information security, if approved.297 We reviewed a current draft of ISO 27799 and found it to be
promising, and to provide more thorough and relevant guidance than
currently exists in other documents.
ISO, IEC, and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineering (''IEEE") have also developed a large number of standards and
gilldelines for various aspects of software engineering. Notable examples
include ISO/IEC 90003:2004, entitled "Software Engineeriog-Guidelines for the Application of ISO 9001:2000 to Computer Software,"29B
which provides gilldance for organizations concerning the acquisition,
supply, development, operation, and maintenance of computer software
and related support services, and ISO/IEC 12207, entitled ''Information
Technology--Software Life-Cycle Processes,''299 which establishes a system for software life-cycle processes.
In addition, at least one national organization is already devoted to
research and development concerning Internet security. CERT is a federally funded center of computer security expertise, operated out of
Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineeriog Institute.300 It stud"" ISO, ISO/IEC 17799:2005, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetaiiPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=39612&1CSI=35&ICS2=40&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
'" ISO, ISO/IEC 2700I:2005, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetaiiPage.CatalogueDetaii?CSNUMBER=42I03&1CS1=35&1CS2=40&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
296 See generally COMMON CRITERIA FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUATION: UsER GuiDE (1999), available at http:/ /wvYlv.comrnoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/
ccusersguide. pdf.
297 ISO/DIS 27799, supra note 254.
'" ISO, ISO/IEC 90003:2004, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetaiiPage.CatalogueDetaii?CSNUMBER=35867&ICS1=35&ICS2=80&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
'" ISO, ISO/IEC 12207:1995, http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetai!Page.CatalogueDetaii?CSNUMBER=21208&1CS1=35&1CS2=80&1CS3= (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
!IOO

See Carnegie Mellon Univ., Software Eng'g Inst., CERT Coordination Center, http:/ I

www.certorg (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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ies Internet security vulnerabilities and long-term changes in networked systems and develops information and training to promote improved security. 301 Among its other features, CERT's website offers security alerts and solutions.302 Certification bodies could require vendors
to follow CERT's recommendations in order to attain certification, and
covered entities not utilizing vendors could also rely on these for guidance.

The NIST, discussed above, 303 has produced not only important
guidance concerning risk analysis,'04 but also a website entitled "National Vulnerability Database. "'05 The website states that the database is
"a comprehensive cyber security vulnerability database that integrates
all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources and provides references to industry resources. "3° 6
The list of standards and resources provided above is not meant to
be exclusive, and, because of the ever-changing nature of technology
and security threats, it would be impractical to attempt to develop a
comprehensive list that would endure over time. Certification bodies
should be expected to remain updated concerning guidelines and resources that are relevant to Pill security and should distribute pertinent information to their certified vendors. Similarly, under the "best
current practices" standard discussed above, covered entities that do
not take advantage of certified vendors would be expected to follow
applicable industry standards and guidelines for IDPAA compliance
.purposes. As an additional aid, CMS should maintain on its website an
updated, nonexclusive list of documents and Internet sources that it
recommends to covered entities.
· It should also be noted that in the comments concerning the proposed Security Rule, HHS acknowledged that it is required to adopt industry standards developed by standards-developing organizations that
are accredited by the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") ,30 7
SOl

Jd .

.!102Jd.

sos See supra notes 154, 263 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 251-254.
305 National Vulnerability Database, http:/ /nvd.nistgov (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). Although it is produced by NIST, the database is sponsored- by the Deparunent of Homeland
Security's National Cyber Security Division. ld.
3116 Id. As of February 23, 2007, the database contained 22,653 vulnerabilities. Id.
!D4

' 07 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8345 (Feb. 20,
2003). However, 42 U.S.C. § l320d-l (c) {2) (B) (2000) provides that "[i]f no standard set-

ting organization has developed, adopted, or modified any standard relating to a standard
that the Secretary is authorized or required to adopt, n the Secretary may create his own
standard.

-----.,-.~--~---- ~
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the U.S. representative ofiSO and IEC.'0B In 2003, HHS concluded that
the available security standards were not technology-neutral, were inconsistent with HIPAA, and were too narrow to be adopted in the final
Rule.'09 The advent of ISO 27799, which will specifically address health
information security,310 should cause HHS to reevaluate its conclusion
and may require revision of the Security Rule to include the new standard's adoption.
It is reasonable to expect that implementation of the proposed
changes to the HIPAA Privacy Rule will influence vendors to provide
relatively low-cost "turnkey" systems for processing and maintaining
PHI that will be affordable even for small businesses.m We anticipate
that all but the largest covered entities will lack the expertise and resources to achieve Security Rule compliance without the assistance of
an intermecliary, and thus, the development of a market for HIPAA
compliance aids is essential.
A Coogle search for HIPAA security turnkey solutions reveals a
number of organizations already purporting to provide such solutions
for compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule.' 12 Some offer comprehensive practice management solutions that combine scheduling; recordkeeping, intraoffice communication, and billing in a single application, thereby centralizing all HIPAA-related electronic data. 313 Other
products offer tutorials, templates, documents, and aids aimed at enabling an entity to achieve HIPAA compliance. 314 Still other applications

sos ANSI, About ANSI-A Historical Overview, http:/ /www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=l (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
~o9 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 58 Fed. Reg. at 8345.
sto See supra text accompanying note 297 .
.!Ill Turnkey systems are "built, supplied, or installed complete and ready to operate. n
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1274 (10th ed. 1995).
s12 Coogle Search for HIPAA Security Turnkey Solutions, http:/ /www.google.com (last

visited Mar. 7, 2007).
31!1 See, e.g., AdvancedMD, http:/ /www.advancedmd.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2007); LeonardoMD Online Medicine, http:/ /W"WW.leonardomd.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). There
are two versions of the LeonardoMD product: standard and professional. Leonardo1viD
Online Medicine, supra. The standard package provides "entry-level practice management
with registration, scheduling, and messaging," and its cost starts at $150 per month with a
one-time $1250 setup charge. !d. The professional packag~ is advertised as providing "comprehensive practice management with scheduling, charge capture, billing, and integrated
chart documentation." Jd. Its cost starts at $300 per month, with a $2500 setup charge. !d.
!114 See, e.g., HipaaManager, http:/ hvww.hipaamanager.com/hm/online_hcat.cfm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2007); NewGovernance HIPM Privacy Accelerator (HPA)-Product Overview (v2.2), http:/ jl.V\VW.newgovernance.com/hpa.httnl (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). The
standard version ofHipaaManager costs $199, the professional version costs $699, and the
institutional version is priced at $2999. HipaaManager, supra.
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are designed for more complex organizations with more sophisticated
technology. Symantec BindView315 is a compliance management application that analyzes an organization's current security profile, suggests
modifications based on best practices, and monitors and reports compliance-related data (for example, who is accessing files containing
PHI) .316 Secureinfo RMS317 claims to cut costs, create a standardized
compliance and accreditation program, and provide packages for regular aucliting. 318 It is likely that increasingly sophisticated and costeffective tools will continue to be developed in response to marketplace
demands for security technology.

D. Bolstering Enforcement Through a Private Cause ofAction
The HIPAA Privacy Rule's lack of a private cause of action diminishes its deterrent and remeclial powers. 319 We recommend that the privacy regulations adopt the approach of many of the other U.S. privacy
laws and the E. U. Privacy Directive, and establish a private cause of action.320

I
!

The HIPAA Privacy Rule's administrative penalties321 should be
retained alongside the private right of litigation. This approach will allow governmental intervention even when no individuals suffer injury,
such as in cases in which electronic security is inadequately maintained
but no information is actually obtained by unauthorized third parties.
It will also introduce the threat of private enforcement in cases that
would not be prioritized by the government for political reasons or that
the government does not have the resources to pursue, which may be

315 Symantec, Regulation Solutions, 1-ITPAA. http:/ /wvvw.bindview.com/solutions/regulations/hipaa.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
!116 /d.
317 Securelnfo RMS, http:/ /www.secureinfo.com/solutions/certification...accreditation/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
318

/d.

See supra notes 159-193 and accompanying text
See supra notes 159-193 and accompanying text. It is well-established that defendants can be subjected to both criminal penalties and punitive damages for the same
!119
!1 20

wrong. See United States v. B<tiakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 (1998) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the institution of both a criminal prosecution and a
later civil in rem forfeiture action); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1357-58 (Me. 1985)
(holding that double jeopardy is not implicated when a defendant is both criminally
proseCuted and required to pay punitive damages for the same· misconduct because the .
latter is imposed in a private civil suit rather than a criminal action).
'" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d·5 to -6 (2000).

!
l
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the vast majority of cases. 322 Without a private cause of action, covered
entities may have incentive to conduct a cost-benefit analysis from
which they conclude that because the cost of compliance is great and
the risk of being penalized for a violation is very small, they should not
aggressively invest in PHI security measures.323
The dual enforcement approach of a private cause of action and
administrative penalties is adopted by several other U.S. privacy Jaws. S24
Borrowing from the private cause of action provisions found in other
privacy legislation, we recommend that the HIPAA statute include the
following language'25:
(a) Any person aggrieved by any act of a covered entity in violation of this section may bring a civil action in a United States
District Court.S2 6
(b) The court may award( I) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in
the amount of$2500;
(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the Jaw;
(3) reasonable attomey's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and
( 4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court
determines to be appropriate_327

s22 See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text; see also Stein, supra note 178 (quoting an HHS administrator as acknowledging that the agency has "challenges with our resources investigating complaintsj.
!12!! See Choi et aL, supra note 2, at 62 (predicting that health care providers will need to
expend billions of dollars to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
'" See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), (h) (i)(1) (2000) (establishing private
cause of action and criminal penalties); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S. C.
§§ 2520, 2522(c) (2000) (establishing private cause of action and civil penalties); Driver's

Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723-2724 (2000) (establishing criminal penalties and a civil cause of action).
! 25 The private cause of action should be added to both the administrative regulations
and the federal statute, given that the means of enforcement are authorized under the
statute itself. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to 1320d·6 (2000).
"'See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1) (D) (providing for a cause of action
whenever an agency "fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual");
Cable Communications Policy Ac~ 47 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1) (2000) (providing that "[a]ny
person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation of this section may bring a civil
action in a United States District Court").
!12 7 See Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (providing identical

language).
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In the future, Congress might consider requiring aggrieved parties
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing lawsuits in court. 328
Presumably, such a system would filter out many of the weakest cases
because lawyers and potential litigants would be discouraged by negative administrative agency findings and would not burden the courts
with frivolous cases. Effective administrative review, however, is dependent upon a strong network of agency offices that are adequately staffed
to process a large volume of claims. HHS's anemic HIPAA enforcement
record indicates that it does not currently have such resources. 329
Some cases brought by private litigants may be complex and large,
with far-reaching impacts. If vendors or certifYing bodies are suspected
of being responsible for Security Rule breaches, they could be joined as
defendants33o under theories of negligence or fraud,'3 1 or be brought
in by covered entities as third party defendants. 332 In addition, cases
involving Security Rule breaches that injure numerous individuals
could generate class actions with hundreds, thousands, or even millions
of plaintiffs. 333
CONCLUSION

An abundance of evidence confirms that the confidentiality of our
private health information faces grave threats from a large number of
sources. The danger of privacy violations will only intensify in the future with increased computerization and centralization of health re-

~a ThiB mechanism has been embraced by several employment discrimination laws, which
establish that potential plaintiffi first must file charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receive a determination and/or a right to sue before
filing a lawsuit in court. See Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),
(f) (I) (2000) (describing the Equal Employment Opportunicy Commission's (the "EEOC's")

charge filing process); Americans with Disabilities Ac~ 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (adopting
Title VII's enforcement provisions for the ADA); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000) (establishing that civil actions may not be commenced prior
to the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC).
329
See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (criticizing HI-IS's enforcement of
HIPAA and reporting that as of June of 2006, the agency imposed no civil penalties on
covered entities).
!!lo See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (discussing permissive joinder of parties).
!l!ll See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction, which allows
tort claims to be joined to related federal statutory claims in some circumstances); FED. R
Ctv. P. 18 (discussing permissive joinder of claims).
!1!1 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction in federal court cases
asserting a federal statutory claim); FED. R Crv. P. 14 (discussing third party practice).
333 See FED. R Crv. P. 23 (discussing class action requirements).
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cords.334 The U.S. government, which has aggressively promoted the
use of electronic health records,335 has responded to concerns about
privacy by enacting HIPAA and its privacy regulations. The legislation
and regulations are, however, significantly flawed from both legal and
technical perspectives. Focusing on the HIPAA Security Rule, this Article presents recommendations to rectify some of its considerable weaknesses.
The new requirements outlined in this Article would need to be
phased in gradually. Just as existing covered entities were given several
years to prepare for compliance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, new covered entities should be given the same courtesy. Moreover, time will
pass before a sufficiently advanced health information security industry
develops to make effective and affordable products readily available for
covered entities. The HHS Secretary should determine a reasonable
compliance deadline for the newly introduced provisions.
A public education campaign would have to be initiated to educate
the public about its rights under the revised regulations and to educate
newly covered entities about their obligations. Similar efforts were
made when the original privacy regulations were enacted. 336
The HIPAA Privacy Rule represents a significant regulatory effort
on the part of the U.S. government and has generated emotional and
often negative responses from the American public. 337 The recommen1154 Stein, supra note 178 (stating that "[p]rivacy advocates say large, centralized electronic databases wiii be especially vulnerable to invasions, making it even more crucial that
existing safeguards be enforced") .
.!135 Mark A Rothstein & Meghan Talbott. Compelled Disclosure of Health Information: Protecting Agninst the Greatest Potential Threat to Privacy. 295 JAMA 2882. 2882 (2006) (discussing the
creation of the Nationwide Health Information Network pW"SUant to President Bush's call for
the promotion of interconnected electronic health records); Terry & Francis, supra note 1, at
1 (noting that in April of 2004, President Bush announced a plan to ensure that Americans'
health records are computerized within ten years); Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for
Health Info. Tech., Goals of Strategic Framework, http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/goals.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (discussing the goal of computerizing health records to promote
''workflow efficiencies" and improved patient care).

~36

See, e.g., HIPAA Compliance Program Offered to Local Companies, DAILY REcoRD (RoehR

ester), Dec. 26, 2003, at 1 (reporting that "[t]heAlliance for IDPAA Compliance, a diverse
and well-integrated team of health care attorneys, consultants and administrators who are
experts in HIPAA issues, offer a program to assist companies in becoming HIPAA. compliant"); Janna Lorenz, Summit Explains New Health Care Rules, TOPEKA CAPITAL-]., Jan. 15,
2002, at 7A (reporting that "'[aJbout 300 people gathered at the Kansas Expocentre ... to
learn about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and what they should
do to get their health care organizations into compliance with that legislation").
337 Although the HIPAA statute was passed in 1996, the privacy regulations took years
to develop and did not become effective until 2003. 45 C.F.R § 164.534 (2006). When it
first published its proposed Rule, HHS received 2350 public comments about iL Health
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dations detailed in this Article should render the HIPAA Security Rule
in particular and the HIPAA Privacy Rule in general far more meaningful. They should benefit both patients, whose privacy and autonomy are
at stake, and organizations seeking guidance concerning compliance
requirements. It is only with rethinking some of HIPAA's statutory and
regulatory provisions that electronic PHI will truly constitute protected
health information.

Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8335 (Feb. 20, 2003). The Rule's
enforcement provisions were not finalized until 2006. HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 8390 (Feb. 16, 2006); see also SoLOVE supra note 13,
at 70 (discussing the controversial nature of the HIPAA regulations).

